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In discussions on energy efficiency, the topic often involves the development of a new 
technology.  But models that target human behavior change can also generate significant 
energy savings, often with less expense.  One such model that has been employed to 
millions of households across the United States is the normative feedback model.  This 
model integrates the most salient research from the field of social norms into the utility 
billing process.  Residents receive a home energy report that compares their energy 
consumption to the average energy consumption of their neighbors.  Resulting behavior 
changes have led to energy savings of between 1.4% and 3.1% (Alcott, 2011).  This 
research tests three variations of the normative feedback model, with the aim of 
determining its boundary conditions and improving it.  Each variation aligns with one of 
the three research objectives:  1) to determine whether normative feedback generates 
significant energy savings when applied to households that are not billed for utility usage, 
2) to determine whether increasing the proximity of comparison increases the energy 
 
 
savings generated by normative feedback, and 3) to determine energy savings associated 
with the implementation of a normative-based utility billing system. 
The first two variations were tested through an experiment conducted at Joint Base 
Andrews in Maryland, where residents are not currently billed for their utility usage.  
Residents received normative feedback via home energy reports for three consecutive 
months.  Results were analyzed through both a differences-in-differences analysis and a 
multiple regression analysis, and an overall energy savings of 3.8% was identified.  Thus, 
the normative feedback model can generate energy savings even in the absence of a 
billing system and could therefore be employed in the two-thirds of military family 
housing that are not yet billed for utilities, with resulting savings of approximately $19.3 
million annually. 
In the home energy report experiment, residents were compared at three different levels 
of proximity:  neighborhood, street, and next-door neighbor.  The analysis identified an 
energy savings of 3.8% at the neighborhood level, 4.9% at the street level, and 2.8% at 
the next-door neighbor level.  These results indicate a “sweet spot” in setting the 
proximity level of comparisons.  By increasing the proximity from the neighborhood to 
the street level, energy savings increased, which is consistent with expectations based on 
a previous study in a different context (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  But 
increasing the proximity further to the next-door neighbor level actually reduced the 
energy savings.  Therefore, to maximize effectiveness, future applications of normative 
feedback for energy efficiency should make comparisons at the street level of proximity. 
 
 
And finally, this research investigated the use of normative feedback as the basis for a 
utility billing system.  Such a system, as implemented at Fort Belvoir in Virginia, 
establishes a monthly baseline equal to the average energy consumption for that month.  
Residents make payments for their consumption over the baseline and receive payments 
for their consumption under the baseline.  A multiple regression analysis found that the 
implementation of this billing system into a community not previously billed for utility 
usage generated an energy savings of 14.1%.  This result takes an important first step 
towards the development of a billing program optimization model for the military’s 
transition to utility billing.
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Whether the discussion is climate change, the increasing cost of energy or dependence on 
foreign oil, reducing energy consumption is consistently recognized as an objective of 
high importance.  The residential sector, accounting for 23% of the total energy 
consumption in the United States (Energy Information Administration, 2011), has often 
been the target of new energy efficient technology.  Yet, for all the technological 
advancements in household energy efficiency, technology alone cannot obtain the full 
potential of energy savings.  The residents themselves must decide to adopt the new 
technology, employ it correctly and, perhaps most significantly, adjust their lifestyles and 
behaviors.  Some studies estimate that changed behaviors alone might reduce household 
energy consumption in the United States by roughly 25% (Gardner & Stern, 2008) 
(Laitner, Ehrhardt-Martinez, & McKinney, 2009).  So, determining and improving upon 
the best methods for influencing residential energy consumption behaviors can go a long 
way in reducing energy consumption. 
Many different approaches exist to encourage energy conservation, such as rewards and 
role models, but one approach in particular has gained much momentum in recent years.  
Drawing from the theory of social norms, researchers demonstrated that providing 
feedback to residents on how their energy consumption compares to the average energy 
consumption of others leads to measurable reductions in energy consumption.  This 
approach is called normative feedback and, after reading a study on this topic, a company 
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called OPOWER formed in 2008 and expanded this approach to hundreds of thousands 
of households across the United States.  They incorporated the most salient research in 
the field and independent analyses have identified a resulting average energy savings of 
2.0% (Alcott, 2011).  The proposed research examines this extensive use of normative 
feedback and tests different variations of its implementation, with the overarching goals 
of defining its boundary conditions and improving it. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Given that normative feedback can change residential energy consumption behaviors, it 
becomes important to know a few more details of OPOWER’s implementation of 
normative feedback.  OPOWER works for various utility companies and thus the targeted 
residents also receive regular utility bills, holding them financially accountable for their 
energy consumption.  The OPOWER program comes alongside this existing billing 
structure to provide residents with home energy reports, usually monthly, that inform 
them of their energy consumption as it compares to approximately 100 of their neighbors 
with similarly sized homes.  These home energy reports, on average, have resulted in an 
overall energy savings of around 2%, with specific applications ranging from 1.4% to 
3.1% (Alcott, 2011). 
One potential boundary condition of this approach is that residents are held financially 
accountable for their energy consumption.  But this is not always the case.  For instance, 
in many apartment complexes and dorm rooms, residents do not receive utility bills.  And 
for decades, residents of military family housing have not had to pay for their utility 
usage.  While this is beginning to change, still more than two thirds of military family 
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housing residents do not pay utility bills (Jowers, 2012).  Does normative feedback for 
energy consumption still yield energy savings when residents are not held financially 
accountable for their energy consumption? 
Also, the OPOWER home energy reports compare residents to approximately 100 of 
their neighbors.  But who are these neighbors?  A resident cannot be completely clear on 
this, because the comparison involves other homes of similar size that use the same fuel 
sources.  While this would usually include many nearby homes, it could easily extend out 
well beyond the neighborhood.  In applications other than energy efficiency, social norms 
research has shown that normative feedback is more powerful when describing the 
behavior of others who share the same “immediate situational circumstances” (Goldstein, 
Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  Perhaps there is some ground to gain here.  What if 
residents received comparisons to others only in their same neighborhood?  Or on their 
same street?  Or even to next door neighbors?  Does normative feedback for energy 
consumption produce increasing savings as the proximity of comparisons increases? 
Finally, what about more extreme applications of normative feedback?  What about a 
normative-based utility billing system?  Such a system would compare the utility 
consumption of each household to the average utility consumption of similar homes, and 
use this comparison as the basis for a monthly billing statement.  If the household’s 
consumption is above average, they are billed for that over-consumption.  If the 
household’s consumption is below average, they receive a credit for that under-
consumption.  And if the household’s consumption is within a certain buffer zone of the 
average, no payment or credit is due.  How much energy savings would such a billing 
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system generate when implemented into a community previously not billed for utility 
usage? 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the proposed research aim to answer the stated research questions.  To 
begin framing the objectives, it is useful to envision the state of the art in normative 
feedback as a simple model.  This basic model can then be varied in different ways to 
help answer the different research questions.  Figure 1.1 provides a visual description of 
the basic model and its results. 
 
Figure 2.1  The Basic Normative Feedback Model 
The first variation of the basic normative feedback model is shown in Figure 1.2, and it 
illustrates the application of the model in an environment with no financial accountability 
for residential energy consumption. 
Research Objective 1:  Determine whether normative feedback generates 
significant energy savings when applied to households that are not held 




Figure 1.2  The Normative Feedback Model in Absence of Financial Accountability 
The second variation of the basic normative feedback model is shown in Figure 1.3, and 
it illustrates changes in comparison groups according to proximity.  This variation, when 
implemented, allows for assessment of the role of comparison group proximity on the 
energy savings produced by normative feedback. 
Research Objective 2:  Determine whether significant differences exist in the 
household energy savings produced by normative feedback when comparison 
groups are altered according to proximity. 
 
Figure 1.3  The Normative Feedback Model with Proximity-Based Comparison Groups 
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The third variation of the basic normative feedback model is shown in Figure 1.4, and it 
illustrates the incorporation of a normative-based utility billing system.  Such a system 
gives financial credits for below average energy consumption and extracts financial 
penalties for above average energy consumption. 
Research Objective 3:  Determine overall energy savings associated with the 
implementation of a normative-based utility billing system into a community 
previously not held financially accountable for household energy consumption. 
 
Figure 1.4  Normative Feedback as Basis for Utility Billing System 
By testing these three variations of the basic normative feedback model in appropriate 
settings, the three research objectives can be met. 
1.4 Research Context:  Military Family Housing 
In a speech at Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado in January of 2012, President Obama 
singled out the Department of Defense as “the world’s largest consumer of energy.”  In 
fact, the Department of Defense consumed 80% of the total energy consumed by all 
agencies of the United States government in 2010 (Energy Information Administration, 
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2011).  The president went on to praise the effort underway by all branches of the armed 
services to reduce energy consumption and help develop alternative energy sources.  
Indeed, energy has become a high priority in the military, both for financial reasons and 
to reduce dependence on foreign oil (Obama, 2012).  While a majority of the energy 
spending is on jet fuel, the military still spends over four billion dollars a year on energy 
for facilities.  Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of those facilities by square footage, 
highlighting that the largest segment is military family housing, representing 20% of the 
facilities in the Department of Defense (Robyn, Department of Defense Facilities Energy, 
2010).  Thus, reducing the energy consumed in military family housing by even small 
percentages can lead to significant savings. 
 
Figure 1.5  Breakdown of Department of Defense Facilities (Robyn, 2010) 
This makes military family housing an ideal place to focus energy efficiency efforts, 
because of the potential for highly scalable energy savings.  If a program can be shown to 
yield significant savings at a low cost, it can be readily extended to other military bases 
throughout the Department of Defense.  Also, since most of the research on influencing 
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human energy consumption behaviors has taken place in residential settings, that research 





Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 The Role of Human Behavior in Residential Energy Consumption 
A discussion of energy efficiency most usually ends up focusing on new technologies, 
economic incentives, and the thermodynamics of a building.  What is often overlooked is 
the significant role that human behavior plays in energy consumption.  The latest energy 
efficient gadget only saves energy when it replaces a less efficient model.  A new 
programmable thermostat only saves energy when actually programmed correctly.  And 
just because new attic insulation will reduce energy consumption and pay for itself in 
energy savings over several years, this does not automatically translate to large numbers 
of homeowners making the investment.  From the temperature setting of hot water 
heaters to powering down printers, people make choices each day about their energy 
consumption behaviors.  These choices have a significant impact on the quantity of 
energy consumed. 
2.1.1 The Potential of Behavior Change to Close the Energy Efficiency Gap 
Traditional approaches to energy efficiency have focused primarily on the development 
and implementation of new technology.  This has undoubtedly led to an increase in 
household energy efficiency.  In fact, the amount of annual household energy consumed 
per capita has decreased from 48 million Btu in 1978 to 38 million Btu in 2007 
(Ehrhardt-Martinez, Laitner, & Reed, 2009).  And, there is more ground to gain in this 
area, with one study indicating that readily available technologies could be implemented 
for savings of more than 25 percent (Stern, 2008).  But, it is also true that many 
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technology employments have not reached their full potential in terms of energy 
efficiency.  Sometimes this is because individuals choose not to make an up-front 
investment, even if that investment will pay for itself within a short period of time.  And 
sometimes, even if an individual purchases the technology, they may not use it in the 
intended way.  For instance, a programmable thermostat only saves energy when it is 
actually programmed, for instance, to adjust the temperature when no one is home.  If it 
is left to simply “hold” a steady temperature all the time, it will obviously not reduce 
energy consumption (Frader-Thompson, 2011). 
This discrepancy between realized energy savings and potential energy savings, as it 
relates to the purchasing and implementation of cost-effective technology, is referred to 
as the energy efficiency gap (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994).  In her testimony before a House of 
Representatives Subcommittee, Ehrhardt-Martinez (2009) describes an additional gap, 
called the attitude-behavior gap.  This describes the discrepancy between people’s 
attitudes towards energy conservation and their actual behavior.  A recent Gallup poll 
indicated that 77% of Americans are worried about the affordability and availability of 
energy and 85% even reported that they “should be spending thousands of dollars to 
increase the energy efficiency of their home.”  However, less than two percent of the 
population is actually incorporating these attitudes into their actions in a significant way 
(Ehrhardt-Martinez, 2009). 
This has all led to an increased interest in the role of human behavior in energy 
consumption, as evidenced by the increasing amounts of literature on the subject and by 
the more than 700 professionals attending the 2011 Behavior, Energy, and Climate 
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Change conference in only the fifth year of the conference’s existence (Foster & Mazur-
Stommen, 2012).  Researchers from the social sciences and engineering fields are coming 
together to explore how a deeper understanding of people’s energy consumption choices 
and activities can play a part in helping to close the two gaps described above.  The 
resulting research over the last several years has produced much evidence that 
understanding and shaping human energy consumption behaviors can indeed 
significantly boost energy efficiencies (Gardner & Stern, 2008) (Ehrhardt-Martinez, 
2008). 
Two such studies have focused on the residential energy sector and have estimated that 
savings from household behavioral changes could be in the range of 20%.  The first study 
identified a domain of actions that a household could take to reduce their energy 
consumption, such as getting rid of a second refrigerator.  It then used a Monte Carlo 
method to account for the uncertainties both in the quantity of associated savings and in 
the adoption rates of the various actions.  This study estimated savings of 8.6 quads (± 
1.5), which would be a 22% reduction in household energy consumption.  This amount of 
savings is roughly equivalent to the total annual energy consumption of Brazil or South 
Korea and is slightly less than the total annual energy consumption of England (~10 
quads) and France (~11 quads) (Laitner, 2010). 
The second study used more of an economist’s approach, incorporating estimates of 
“behavioral plasticity” to account for the uncertainty in the adoption rates of various 
energy saving behaviors.  This study estimated savings of 20% in household energy 
consumption (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009).  It should be noted 
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that in both this study and the one previously described, household energy consumption is 
defined to include the operation of household vehicles as well. 
In calculating the estimated savings described above, both studies categorized potential 
energy saving actions.  In the second study, the researchers specifically identified 17 
behavior changes and grouped them into five different categories on the basis of 
behaviorally relevant attributes.  These categories, shown in Table 2.1, reflect both the 
cost and frequency required for the behavior changes.   
Category of Behavior Change Examples 
W actions:  home 
weatherization upgrades of 
heating and cooling equipment 
attic insulation, high-
efficiency windows, 
replacing old HVAC units 
E actions:  more efficient non-
heating and cooling equipment 
adopting more energy-
efficient appliances and 
equipment 
M actions:  equipment 
maintenance 
changing air filters in HVAC 
systems 




temperatures on water 
heaters 
D actions:  daily use behaviors eliminating standby 
electricity, thermostat 
setbacks, line drying 
Table 2.1  Categories for Energy Conservation Behavior Changes (Dietz, et al., 2009) 
Another approach to categorize potential energy-related behavior changes defines a 
Behavior Energy Response Continuum (Laitner, Ehrhardt-Martinez, & McKinney, 2009).  
This is shown in Figure 1.6.  This puts all such changes on a continuum, with the left side 
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representing habits and lifestyles and the right side representing technology choices.  In 
the middle are infrequent, low-cost or no-cost energy saving actions. 
 
Figure 2.1  The Behavior Energy Response Continuum (Laitner et al. 2009) 
Regardless of the method of categorizing energy conservation behaviors, it is important 
to note the different characteristics of potential actions.  In designing a program to reduce 
energy consumption, different target populations will have different inclinations towards 
the potential energy conserving actions.  For instance, a population of renters, such as in 
military family housing, will not be inclined (in fact, usually not allowed) to install new 
windows or insulation.  Only a homeowner would typically be willing to make such an 
investment.  So a program designed for military family housing should not try to 
encourage the higher-cost technology investments represented by the right side of the 
continuum and by the Category W actions described previously (McMakin, Malone, & 
Lundgren, 2002). 
To further underscore the importance of behavior in accomplishing significant energy 
savings, the city of Juneau, Alaska deserves mentioning.  When an avalanche destroyed 
power transmission lines in April of 2008, the city had to rely on a bank of diesel-
powered generators for their electricity production.  The price of electricity increased 
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500% (Leighty & Meier, 2011).  Within two weeks, Juneau had cut their electricity 
consumption by 20% and by May, their electricity use was down by 40% (Berkeley Lab 
News Center, 2008).  This demonstrates that when people get serious about saving 
energy, they can quickly and significantly reduce their consumption.  This 
accomplishment involved a large and coordinated effort.  It involved quick energy audits 
of local businesses and a public campaign to engage people in the cause, encouraging 
them to unplug anything needlessly drawing power and replace incandescent bulbs with 
compact fluorescents.  Also, the local utility provided feedback to the public, charting the 
progress made towards energy conservation.  All of this facilitated the people of the city 
getting the message that in order to be good citizens they needed to take immediate steps 
to reduce their energy consumption (Berkeley Lab News Center, 2008).  And it is also 
interesting to note that 8% of the energy savings persisted even after the crisis was over 
(Leighty & Meier, 2011). 
2.1.2 Behavior-Based Energy Efficiency Interventions 
While the story of Juneau provides a drastic example of what is possible when people get 
serious about the task at hand, the increasing amount of research in this subject area has 
produced numerous examples of intentional programs that have also effectively 
motivated people to alter their energy consumption behaviors.  These conservation 
programs can be broken down into two categories:  antecedent interventions and 
consequence interventions (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005). 
Antecedent interventions aim to influence behavioral determinants, such as knowledge, 
before the behavior occurs.  This would include interventions such as commitments, goal 
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setting, information, and role modeling.  A commitments intervention invokes an oral or 
written pledge or promise from the residents to change their energy consuming behavior.  
This commitment can be made to one’s self, but it is more effective when made publicly.  
Goal setting is similar to the commitments approach, but attaches a specific goal, such as 
energy savings of five percent.  The information intervention equips residents with 
knowledge on how to save energy and provides specific tips to that effect.  And finally, 
the role modeling intervention directs attention to those who are already excelling in their 
energy conservation.  These residents are highlighted in newsletters, mailings, or at 
public events, and their energy conservation behaviors are put forward as encouragement 
to their neighbors.  A review of these antecedent interventions concluded that specificity 
and personalization usually lead to increased energy savings and that these interventions 
are most effective in combination (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005). 
Consequence interventions provide positive or negative consequences for energy 
consumption behaviors.  Behaviors that decrease consumption receive positive 
consequences, while behaviors that increase energy consumption receive negative 
consequences.  These types of interventions include rewards and feedback.  A rewards 
program simply provides a reward as a positive consequence to energy conservation 
behavior.  The reward is most usually a monetary incentive.  Feedback programs provide 
residents with feedback on the amount of their energy consumption.  The feedback can be 
monthly, weekly, daily, or continuous, and can sometime involve comparisons to other 
households.  In this way, the feedback acts as a consequence to the household’s energy 
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consumption and provides a reference point and motivation for behavior change 
(Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005). 
While all of these different types of interventions have been shown to be effective at 
times and ineffective at times, it is generally agreed that particular combinations increase 
effectiveness.  For instance, a household might make a public commitment to reach a 
certain goal and then receive feedback each month on their progress towards that goal.  
Such an example would combine commitment, goal setting, and feedback, thus 
strengthening the potential impact of the intervention. 
One important issue in evaluating different behavior-based energy efficiency 
interventions is the issue of scale.  If a particular intervention demonstrates an ability to 
generate high levels of energy savings, but it requires extensive resources and tailoring 
for each individual household, it may not be realistic to apply that intervention across a 
wide region of homes.  For instance, a particular program at Travis Air Force Base used 
personalized coaching, rewards, and electronic information displays in the home to 
generate 18% savings (Balfour Beatty, 2010).  But this study involved only 21 
households and would require a large investment of time and money to implement at a 
large scale.  This sort of an intervention can also be referred to as an opt-in strategy, in 
that residents have to be willing to participate.  In contrast, an opt-out strategy 
automatically includes residents in the program unless they take action to declare their 
unwillingness to participate.  This allows for opt-out interventions to obtain significantly 
higher participate rates (Ehrhardt-Martinez, Donnelly, & Laitner, 2010). 
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One particular application of an opt-out feedback intervention has demonstrated an 
ability to generate energy savings at an extremely large scale.  A company named 
OPOWER has incorporated academic research on social norms to provide customized 
feedback to hundreds of thousands of households across the United States.  This approach 
relies on comparing a household’s energy consumption to that of other households in the 
area.  It is a simple approach that extends easily across large regions.  The roots of this 
idea grew in the social sciences over the last several decades. 
2.2 Social Norms Theory Applied to Energy Efficient Behaviors 
Social norms theory essentially states that people often pattern their behaviors after what 
they perceive to be normal social behaviors.  As will be explained more fully below, this 
theory has led to many applications in the area of alcohol consumption of college 
students.  In such an application, the focus is on correcting the difference between what a 
student perceives as socially normal behavior and what the actual socially normal 
behavior is.  But social norms also have application strictly as a type of feedback.  By 
providing people with information on socially normal behavior, they may then be 
inclined to alter their own behavior towards the behavior most often chosen by others.  
This can be a helpful tool in modifying the behavior of communities.  In the context of 
household energy efficiency, the provision of feedback on the energy consumption of 
other households can prompt a change in energy consumption behavior. 
2.2.1 Foundational Applications of Social Norms Theory 
As far back as 1936, the term “social norms” has been used in the fields of sociology and 
social psychology (Sherif, 1936).  A formal definition of social norms theory states that 
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“people tend to adopt group attitudes and act in accordance with group expectations and 
behaviors based on affiliation needs and social comparison processes, social pressures 
toward group conformity, and the formation and acquisition of reference group norms.”  
This definition points out that people tend to alter both their attitudes and behaviors 
towards what they perceive as normal attitudes and behaviors.  The establishment of this 
theory resulted from a large amount of literature throughout the twentieth century that 
demonstrated group norms as an independent variable with high explanatory power in 
predicting individual attitudes and behavior (Perkins W. H., 2002). 
One of the more well-known studies on social norms used littering in public places as its 
context.  In this study, subjects returned to their cars in a university hospital parking 
garage.  On their way to their cars, they witnessed a student dropping a handbill onto the 
ground.  Two experimental conditions existed while observing the student litter.  In one 
condition, the surface of the parking garage was covered in similar litter.  In the other 
condition, the surface was still littered, but all the litter had been swept into three neat 
piles. When the subjects reached their car, they found an identical handbill on their 
windshield, and the study monitored the percentage of individuals in each condition who 
chose to drop the handbill to the ground before driving away.  In the scattered litter 
condition, 45% of the subjects littered, while in the swept piles condition, only 18% of 
the subjects littered.  Previous research had already established that subjects are more 
likely to litter into an environment that is already littered.  The value of this study lies in 
the fact that while both conditions contained littered environments, subjects behaved 
differently when the litter was swept into piles.  That is, they encountered a descriptive 
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norm demonstrating that many others were littering, but they also encountered an 
injunctive norm demonstrating that such littering is not okay and needs to be cleaned up 
(Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).  This distinction between descriptive and injunctive 
norms is important and will be referenced further on in this literature review. 
Over the last twenty five years, researchers have begun to find more practical 
applications for social norms.  Beyond just the ability of social norms to explain aspects 
of human behavior, some social psychologists began using their knowledge about social 
norms to influence human behavior.  Specifically, as stated before, they focused on the 
issue of excessive drinking of alcohol among college students.  Two researchers, H. 
Wesley Perkins and Alan Berkowitz, found a pattern of misperceptions among students 
with regard to levels of drinking among their peers.  They found that students typically 
overestimated how often and how much their peers were drinking, and typically regarded 
their peers as more permissive in their attitudes toward drinking than they actually were.  
Based on social norms theory, if students perceived norms for drinking that were 
different than the actual norms, they would likely be targeting the “wrong” norms in their 
social drinking behavior.  Thus, these researchers suggested that correcting these 
misperceptions could reduce dangerous overconsumption of alcohol among college 
students (Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). 
A number of subsequent studies at various institutions followed this suggestion.  They 
designed and implemented programs to measure actual high-risk drinking rates and then 
inform students of those actual rates.  They consistently found that correcting student 
misperceptions about typical drinking behavior on their campus led to significant 
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reductions in high-risk drinking rates by as much as 20%.  This strategy of 
communicating actual social norms to dispel misperceived social norms is often referred 
to as the social norms approach. (Perkins W. H., 2002) 
According to the National Social Norms Institute at the University of Virginia, most 
research in the field of social norms breaks down into two general categories.  The first 
category involves the social norms approach that has already been described.  The second 
category does not involve a correction of misperceived norms or even an attempt to 
measure perceptions, but simply provides feedback on actual norms and measures any 
resulting changes or differences in behaviors or attitudes.  This approach is referred to as 
normative feedback (National Social Norms Institute, 2012). 
A recent study demonstrated the power of normative feedback in motivating 
environmental conservation.  This study examined the effectiveness of signs in hotel 
rooms requesting quests to reuse their towels.  The control group had standard signs hung 
in the bathrooms that made an environmental appeal for guests to reuse their towels so 
that resources could be conserved.   The test group signs, in addition to the environmental 
appeal, contained a descriptive norm that essentially stated, “The majority of our guests 
reuse their towels.”  This normative messaging proved superior to the environmental-only 
appeal, increasing the towel reuse rate from 35% to 44%.  Of additional interest is that, 
on a second round of this experiment, normative messaging was modified to state, “The 
majority of our guests in this room reuse their towels.”  The authors refer to this as a 
provincial norm, when a proximity identifier is added to the descriptive norm.  They 
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found that towel reuse increased to 49% in rooms receiving the provincial norm 
messaging (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). 
2.2.2 Normative Feedback for Energy Efficient Behavior 
As more normative feedback studies reported results, many described positive results.  
That is, the normative feedback produced the intended effect.  However, some studies 
found no substantial effects and some studies found undesirable effects (Fischer, 2008).  
Much of the problem, it seemed, stemmed from what is known as the boomerang effect 
(Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  Since the theory of social 
norms indicates behavior change towards perceived normality, the resulting behavior 
change from a correction in perceived norms might be a positive change or it could a 
negative change.  For instance, with regard to providing normative feedback on home 
energy consumption, it is expected that an over-consuming household would adjust their 
behaviors to reduce their overall energy consumption in order to be more in line with the 
norm.  This would be viewed as a positive change.  But a household that is already 
demonstrating the desired behavior by under-consuming energy may respond to the 
normative feedback by relaxing their energy efficient behaviors, and in so doing become 
more normal.  That is, they may actually increase their consumption as a result of 
receiving normative feedback on their energy consumption.  This phenomenon is known 
as the boomerang effect. 
A field study on aspects of this boomerang effect that began applying the theory of social 
norms to energy consumption behaviors.  The research team designed an experiment to 
see if the use of injunctive norms could eliminate the undesired boomerang effect.  As 
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alluded to before, descriptive norms simply describe normal behavior, while injunctive 
norms attach an element of social approval or disapproval to a given behavior.  The 
research involved placing doorhangers throughout a neighborhood, with each doorhanger 
containing normative feedback regarding that household’s electricity consumption.  Half 
of the subject households received only descriptive normative messages, detailing the 
average neighborhood electricity consumption.  These messages produced electricity 
savings amongst high electricity consumers, but increased electricity consumption 
amongst low electricity consumers.  This demonstrated the presence of the boomerang 
effect.  The other half of the subject households received doorhangers that contained 
similar descriptive normative information but with an injunctive message also included.  
The injunctive message was a smiley face emoticon () if the household had consumed 
less electricity than the average, and a sad face emoticon () if the household had 
consumed more electricity than the average.  The effect of this injunctive message was to 
significantly reduce the undesired boomerang effect.  On average, the households that 
were consuming electricity at below average rates continued to consume at the same 
below average rates, instead of increasing their consumption as did the low-consuming 
households which did not receive the injunctive messaging (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, 
Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  This study provides strong evidence that injunctive 
norms can counter the boomerang effect. 
2.2.3 OPOWER’s Large-Scale Application of Normative Feedback 
It was the study just described that got the attention of the founders of OPOWER (Alcott, 
2011).  If the boomerang effect could be avoided, allowing the highly-reproducible 
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normative feedback to generate significant energy savings, they realized the potential to 
apply the intervention on a very large scale.  OPOWER uses home energy reports as the 
mode of providing normative feedback to residents.  These home energy reports are 
mailed to residents on either a monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly basis, depending on the 
billing cycle of the respective utility company.  The reports contain a comparison 
between the household’s energy consumption data and the average consumption of 
approximately 100 neighbors with similarly sized homes that are fueled by the same 
energy sources (i.e. electricity only or electricity and natural gas).  This information 
represents the descriptive norms discussed previously.  The reports also contain 
injunctive norms to counter the boomerang effect.  This is accomplished through the use 
of emoticons () to indicate social approval for low energy consuming behavior.    
Figure 2.2 contains a sample comparison from one of OPOWER’s home energy reports. 
 
Figure 2.2  Sample of Normative Feedback in OPOWER’s Home Energy Reports 
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As is evident on the sample, OPOWER includes an additional layer of comparison.  They 
compare the household to “Efficient Neighbors,” the most efficient 20 percent of 
neighbors, that is the lowest 20 percent of consumers.  This provides additional 
motivation for households consuming at below average levels but still with room for 
improvement, helping to further counter the boomerang effect.  The reports also contain 
tips for residents on how to actually go about lowering their energy consumption.  And it 
should also be noted that while the sample in Figure 2.2 compares strictly electricity 
consumption, OPOWER also sends reports to dual fuel households.  In such cases, 
energy consumption can be compared by converting electricity usage from kWh to kBtu 
and converting natural gas usage from ccf to kBtu and then simply adding to obtain a 
total value for household energy consumption in kBtu. 
OPOWER began their work in 2008 by mailing home energy reports to 35,000 
households within the footprint of Sacramento Municipal Utility District.  An analysis 
completed after one year of mailings demonstrated a significant difference in energy 
consumption between treatment and control groups, representing an energy savings of 
2.1% (Ayres, Raseman, & Shih, 2009).  Since then, OPOWER has continued to expand 
its reach, partnering with over 50 utility companies in 22 states across the United States 
(Crawford & Fischer, 2011).  Multiple independent analyses have demonstrated 
associated energy savings between 1.5% – 3.5% (Ayres, Raseman, & Shih, 2009) 
(Agnew, Niu, Tanimoto, Goldberg, & Wilhelm, 2010).  The most comprehensive 
analysis observed 22 million utility bills from nearly 600,000 households, encompassed 
twelve different utility companies, and determined that the implementation of 
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OPOWER’s home energy reports program yields an average energy savings of 2.0% 
(Alcott, 2011).  They seem poised to continue their growth, with California Public 
Utilities Commission now allowing investor-owned utilities to claim energy savings that 
result from behavior-based efficiency programs (Smith & Sullivan, 2011). 
2.3 Identification of Knowledge Gaps 
With the use of normative feedback so quickly emerging as a highly cost-effective means 
of changing resident behavior, research in the field has accelerated.  But there remain 
some significant gaps in the body of knowledge.  Opportunities exist to evaluate the 
application of normative feedback to households that do not have financial incentive to 
conserve energy, and the consideration of proximity in defining comparison groups for 
normative feedback. 
The application of normative feedback to energy consumption necessarily occurs within 
the confines of certain boundary conditions.  For instance, the target behavior, namely 
energy conservation, has widespread social approval, is private, is reoccurring, and 
perhaps most significantly, has a direct personal benefit in terms of money saved from 
reduced utility bills.  It is not known whether normative feedback can produce energy 
savings in the absence of financial incentives.  And, just as the application of normative 
feedback to energy consumption grew out of the field of social norms, so the results can 
feed back in to that same field for other applications.  It is not known, for instance, if 
injunctive norms can counter the boomerang effect when individuals are not financially 
motivated to demonstrate a particular behavior (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicius, 2007).  Such knowledge would inform the application of normative 
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feedback to other areas such as alcohol consumption, littering, and illegal downloading of 
music. 
Heretofore the application of normative feedback to energy consumption has almost 
exclusively based comparisons on either a neighborhood average or the average of 
approximately 100 nearby homes.  One study did investigate the differential effects of 
comparing household consumption to country, regional, or neighborhood averages.  That 
study found that low energy consumers increased their consumption when compared to 
national averages, but reduced their consumption when compared to neighbors (Loock, 
2011).  It is not clear how much consumption increased or decreased or whether or not 
injunctive norms were included with the feedback.  What remains to be discovered is the 
effect of increasing the proximity of comparison within the neighborhood level.  A study 
on normative feedback for college alcohol consumption found that increasing norm 
proximity, in this case how well the subject knew those in the comparison group, 
increased the impact of the feedback (Cho, 2006).  This concept of increasing the 
relevancy, and resulting impact, of normative feedback by increasing the proximity of the 




Chapter 3:  Home Energy Report Experiment 
In response to the knowledge gaps identified in the literature review and further research 
needs described in this chapter, an experiment was conducted to test variations of the 
basic normative feedback model in order to contribute to the rapidly expanding field of 
human factors in energy efficiency.  Because of the large scale and prominence of 
OPOWER’s work, the basic normative feedback model is framed upon their processes 
and results.  This simple model and its variations facilitate the discussion of the purposes 
and hypotheses of the home energy report experiment.     Figure 3.1 below depicts again 
the basic normative feedback model. 
 
Figure 3.1  The Basic Normative Feedback Model 
3.1 Experiment Purposes and Hypotheses 
The home energy report experiment assesses two variations of the basic normative 
feedback model.  As will be evident in the proceeding sections, the second variation, in 
its implementation, is really more of a sub-variation of the first.  They are framed as 
separate variations in this research because they answer distinctly separate research 
questions.  One feature of this research framework is that it allows an experiment aimed 
28 
 
at testing the second variation to inherently provide testing of the first variation as well.  
Thus, the home energy report, as described in this chapter, will be used to test two 
variations of the basic normative feedback model. 
3.1.1 Variation 1:  Normative Feedback in Absence of Billing System 
The first variation of the basic normative feedback model alters the environment into 
which the normative feedback is applied.  It changes the boundary condition of financial 
incentives.  Previous applications of normative feedback have focused on households that 
exist within a traditional utility billing system, such that residents are financially 
motivated to conserve energy.  The less energy they consume, the lower their utility bills 
will be.  And conversely, the more energy they consume, the higher their utility bills will 
be.  The first variation of the basic model allows for testing on whether normative 
feedback can produce energy savings when no utility billing system is in place. 
This carries importance beyond contributing to the field of social norms.  If normative 
feedback can be shown to produce energy savings even when no billing system is in 
place, it could be extensively applied to such settings.  Many university dormitories and 
apartment complexes do not currently bill residents for their utility usage.  And although 
the military is slowly incorporating utility billing programs into military family housing, 
the full transition will take at least six more years.  Currently, two-thirds of households 
on military bases are not held financially accountable for their utility usage (Jowers, 
2012).  Even incorporating normative feedback while details of different billing programs 
are worked out could lead to significant energy savings. 
29 
 
The foundational research on normative feedback was never constrained by the boundary 
condition of financial incentives for behavioral choices.  In applications such as littering 
and alcohol consumption, subjects were not motivated to behave one way or another due 
to any financial incentives.  Yet, normative feedback still influenced their behaviors.  
Therefore, the proposed research makes the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Normative feedback on residential energy consumption will still 
produce positive energy savings even when residents have no financial incentive 
to conserve.  This hypothesis is represented in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2  Hypothesis 1:  Positive Energy Savings in Absence of Billing System 
3.1.2 Variation 2:  Proximity Based Normative Feedback 
The second variation of the normative feedback model alters the comparison groups upon 
which the normative feedback is based, in order to test differences in energy savings as 
the proximity of the comparison group changes.  While no study has tested this aspect of 
normative feedback for energy consumption, one study did develop some guidelines for 
comparison groups, though this was only based on resident surveys.  The study noted that 
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shrinking the geographical scope of comparison groups improved the quality of 
comparison, and highlighted street name as a promising comparison group (Iyer, 
Kempton, & Payne, 2006).  Thus, the proposed research intends to establish a “Street” 
comparison group, as well as one level of decreased proximity, “Neighborhood”, and one 
level of increased proximity, “Next-Door Neighbors.” 
This variation of the basic model is motivated by research that has applied normative 
feedback in other areas.  For instance, the hotel room towel study previously described 
found that hotel guests were more likely to reuse their towel when exposed to normative 
feedback on the reuse rates of other guests who had stayed in the same room, versus just 
being compared to other guests who had stayed anywhere throughout the hotel 
(Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  This can be described as increasing the 
proximity of the comparison.  Applying this understanding to residential energy 
consumption leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  Increasing the comparison group proximity in normative feedback 
for residential energy consumption will increase the amount of energy savings.  
This hypothesis is represented in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3  Hypothesis 2:  Increased Energy Savings with Increasing Comparison Group Proximity 
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3.2 Experiment Design 
These two variations of the normative feedback model have been tested through a 
controlled experiment that involved mailing home energy reports to households at Joint 
Base Andrews in Maryland.  The home energy report experiment spanned four 
consecutive summer months, from June to September of 2012, with three mailings sent 
out during that span.  The June energy consumption data produced the June home energy 
reports, and the impact of those reports was determined by analyzing July consumption 
data.  This process was repeated three times, with the final iteration being the August 
home energy reports, of which the impact was determined by analyzing September 
consumption data.  This process produced, therefore, three months of consumption data 
(July, August, September) that can be used to analyze and determine the impact of the 
home energy report mailings.  The homes at Joint Base Andrews are individually metered 
and no billing program is in place, making this an appropriate setting for testing these two 
variations of the model.  The homes are owned by Clark Realty Group and they granted 
permission for this experiment. 
3.2.1 Military Family Housing at Joint Base Andrews 
Joint Base Andrews has been known as Andrews Air Force Base until the most recent 
round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).  Joint Base Andrews has privatized 
housing, which means that Clark Realty Group used its capital to build and renovate 
homes on the base and thereby became the owner of those homes.  As the owner, they 
now receive rent payments each month from the government.  The rent money comes 
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from the budgeted housing allowances the military members would have received if they 
lived in a home outside the base. 
The housing office at Joint Base Andrews provided a master database of the homes on 
the base.  According to that database, the housing stock contains 770 homes that exist 
within 12 different neighborhoods and on 30 different streets.  192 of these homes have 
been built since 2005, and 359 of the older homes have been renovated since 2005.  Unit 
types include single family homes, duplexes, and townhouses.  The homes are 
individually metered for utilities, to include water.  They are fueled by both electricity 
and natural gas.  While no utility billing program is currently in place, Clark Realty 
Group has recently hired a company to implement and manage such a program.  The data 
available for the experiment were monthly electricity (kWh) and natural gas (ccf) usage 
data for each household, however the natural gas meter readings have not yet been 
deemed reliable by Clark Realty Group, so only electricity usage data was used in this 
experiment.  This lack of reliable natural gas data is of little consequence, because the 
experiment took place during summer months when electricity-powered air conditioning 
units dominate the energy consumption of a typical home in the region, as opposed to 
winter months when gas-powered furnaces dominate the energy consumption. 
3.2.2 Description of the Home Energy Reports 
The home energy report experiment involved mailing normative feedback on household 
energy consumption to households in three different test groups, with the test groups 
varying from each other only in the comparison level of the normative feedback 
contained in the home energy reports they received.  That is, they varied in whether their 
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energy consumption was compared to the average energy consumption of the entire 
neighborhood, their street only, or just their next-door neighbors.  This normative 
feedback was modeled after OPOWER’s home energy reports, as that is a format that has 
proven effective.  The reports include descriptive norms, in that they compare the 
previous month’s electricity consumption of the household to that of other households.  
These descriptive norms are presented in a horizontal bar chart format.  There are three 
bars on the chart, one for the monthly electricity consumption of each of the following:  
1) the subject household, 2) the average for the households in the applicable comparison 
group, and 3) the average for the most efficient 20% of the households in the applicable 
comparison group.  The ordering of the three bars is in ascending order, such that the bar 
with the lowest value (representing the lowest consumption) is at the top.  This represents 
a subtle injunctive norm because it implies a performance ranking of the three groups of 
households.  The subject household can infer that they are doing better than or worse than 
other households simply based on whether they are listed above or below the other 
households. 
The home energy reports also include some less-subtle injunctive norms, offering further 
indication of social approval or disapproval for energy efficient behavior in the form of 
labels and emoticons.  If a household consumed less electricity than both the comparison 
group average and the most efficient households in the comparison group, they are 
labeled as “Great” and receive two smiley face emoticons.  If a household consumed less 
electricity than the comparison group average, but more electricity than the most efficient 
households in the comparison group, they are labeled as “Good” and receive one smiley 
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face emoticon.  If a household consumed more electricity than both the comparison group 
average and the most efficient households in the comparison group, they are labeled as 
“More than Average” and do not receive any smiley face emoticons.  These labels and 
emoticons are contained in the home energy reports inside a box titled “HOW YOU’RE 
DOING” just to the right side of the bar chart.  Figure 3.4 shows these three different 
forms of the normative feedback that vary depending on the subject household’s energy 




Figure 3.4  Three Different Performance Categories:  “Great,” “Good,” or “More than Average” 
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The data presented in the home energy reports are in watt-hours per square feet 
(watt∙hr/ft
2
).  While the kilowatt-hour (kWh) unit is the commonly accepted unit for 
measuring electricity consumption for utility billing purposes, the comparisons in these 
home energy reports needed to account for the varying house sizes throughout the 
villages on Joint Base Andrews.  In some villages, single family homes and townhomes 
are found within the same neighborhood, and to compare these homes without 
normalizing the data to account for the different sizes would greatly increase the chance 
of the comparison being dismissed by residents as unfair or not meaningful.  To account 
for this, the raw monthly electricity usage for each household (in kWh) was divided by 
the size of the home (in ft
2
).  This left the data with units of kWh/ft
2
, but values in the 
range of 0.3 to 1.3.  These low values would rely on numbers to the right of the decimal 
point to differentiate between households, which would be confusing and distracting to 
residents.  So, the values were multiplied by 1,000, leaving the data with units of watt-
hr/ft
2
, and values in the range of 300 to 1,300, which would be more digestible to 
residents. 
The reports also included tips on how to reduce household energy consumption, and these 
tips were based on recommendations from the Department of Energy for homeowners 
interested in reducing their energy consumption (Department of Energy, 2012).  These 
tips were tailored in two ways:  1) for military family housing, in that they do not include 
any recommended upgrades to the home itself, such as insulation or new windows, as the 
residents do not own the homes; and 2) for the summer season in which the experiment 
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took place, in that the tips included encouragement to raise the thermostat setting, as 
opposed to lowering it in the winter season. 
Each home energy report was mailed in an envelope displaying the address of the 
housing office, “Liberty Park at Andrews”, as the return address and simply stated 
“Resident” as the name of the addressee.  Along with a customized home energy report 
with the household address at the top, each mailing also included a brief cover letter 
explaining that this effort was part of a research project and that the energy report should 
not be considered a bill.  This avoided confusion among residents and was a necessary 
condition for permission to conduct the experiment.  The cover letters were essentially 
the same from month to month, and the cover letter for June is included as Appendix A.  
The home energy reports were generated in Microsoft Word with graphs imported from 
Microsoft Excel. 
3.2.2 Categories of Comparison 
As described in the previous section, the home energy reports categorize households 
based on their performance during the previous month.  This categorization takes place 
within a larger categorization, that of the treatment categorization.  Before energy 
consumptions could be compared and home energy reports generated, households had to 
first be categorized into the three different treatment categories.  The treatment groups 
varied only by comparison level.  That is, their monthly energy consumption was 
compared to the average energy consumption of either:  1) their entire neighborhood, 2) 
all the households on their street, or 3) their next-door neighbors. 
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In the “Neighborhood” treatment group, households received home energy reports that 
compared their monthly electricity usage to the average electricity usage of all the 
occupied households in their neighborhood.  Table 3.1 provides a listing of the 12 





Adams Circle 35 
Airey Court 6 
Cleveland Square 61 
Fairway Drive 13 
Jefferson Village 95 
Lincoln Place 81 
Madison Cove 64 
Monroe Gardens 119 
Roosevelt Court 125 
Truman Place 104 
Washington Estates 13 
Wilson Square 54 
Total 770 
Table 3.1  Neighborhoods on Joint Base Andrews 
In the “Street” treatment group, households received home energy reports that compared 
their monthly electricity usage to the average electricity usage of all occupied households 
on their street.  Table 3.2 provides a listing of the 30 different streets on Joint Base 











Airey Court 6 
 
Laurel Drive 41 
Ashwood Circle 23 
 
Madison Drive 26 
Atlanta Avenue 12 
 
Maple Lane 13 
Bedford Drive (2000's) 48 
 
McCullin Court 24 
Bedford Drive (2200's) 19 
 
Rosewood Drive 45 
Beech Lane 18 
 
Spruce Court 54 
Cedar Drive 2 
 
Taylor Run 16 
Chicago Drive 61 
 
Tucson Avenue 38 
Columbus Circle 35 
 
Vandenburg Drive 13 
Dawson Court 18 
 
Washington Drive 7 
Dogwood Lane 12 
 
Waterview Court 19 
Edgebrook Drive 52 
 
West Perimeter Road 26 
Elm Lane 14 
 
White Court 16 
Fairway Drive 13 
 
Wilmington Drive 43 
Lahm Court 23 
 
Yuma Road 33 
   
Total 770 
Table 3.2.  Streets on Joint Base Andrews 
In the “Next-Door Neighbor” treatment group, households received home energy reports 
that compared their monthly electricity usage to the average electricity usage of four 
neighboring households, specifically the nearest two occupied households on each side of 
the treatment household.  Maps provided by the housing office at Joint Base Andrews 
were used to determine the appropriate comparison houses for each treatment house.  
Figure 3.5 shows the bar charts from the home energy reports that made comparisons at 






Figure 3.5  Three Different Comparison Categories:  “Neighborhood,” 
“Street,” or “Next-Door Neighbor” 
As noted before, within each of the three treatment categories, households were further 
categorized each month according to their energy performance.  Within each treatment 
group, households were categorized as “Great,” “Good,” or “More Than Average.”  
Thus, there were essentially nine different types of reports that a treatment household 
could possibly receive in any given month of the home energy report experiment.  Table 
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3.3 provides a simple matrix portraying these nine different types of reports, and 
Appendix B provides a sample of each of these nine types of reports.  It should be noted 
again here that within each report type, each household received a customized home 














Neighborhood (N) N, GRT N, GD N, MTA 
Street (S) S, GRT S, GD S, MTA 
Next-Door Neighbor 
(NDN) 
NDN, GRT NDN, GD NDN, MTA 
Table 3.3  Nine Different Category Combinations on Home Energy Reports 
As can be seen in the home energy reports in Appendix X, each report also contains 
clarification on just who the household is being compared to.  This is found in the section 
just below the horizontal bar chart.  The question is spelled out:  “WHO ARE YOUR 
NEIGHBORS?”  In the space to the right of the question is found the answer that 
explains whether the household was compared at the Neighborhood, Street, or Next-Door 
Neighbor level.  The answer also explains that only occupied homes were included in the 
comparison and that the “Most Efficient Neighbors” are the most energy efficient 20% of 
the households in the comparison. 
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3.3 Experiment Execution 
The home energy reports were mailed to three treatment groups which were initially 
comprised of 75 households each.  But before any mailings could be sent, the households 
on Joint Base Andrews had to be randomly placed into the three treatment groups.  All 
households not in one of the three treatment groups were considered part of the control 
group.  Aside from receiving the reports, households in the treatment group were not 
treated any differently than households in the control group.  The households in each 
group were randomly selected from the neighborhoods across Joint Base Andrews.  The 
households in each of the three treatment groups received the same personalized home 
energy reports, except that the category of comparison differed.   
3.3.1 Random Selection of Treatment Households 
It was expected that the sample sizes would decrease substantially by the end of the 
experiment, due to the high turnover rates of military personnel, who usually move every 
two to four years and usually in the summer.  As this experiment took place during the 
summer months, it was anticipated that approximately one third of the residents in the 
study would move during the course of the experiment.  Consumption data from any 
household that experienced a move during the study was thrown out.  This was accounted 
for in the selection of sample sizes.  In each experimental group, 75 households would 
produce 225 observations over three months.  Anticipating 33% getting thrown out, that 
would leave about 150 observations in each experimental group, which would allow 
enough statistical power to demonstrate differences between the treatment groups.  This 
anticipated attrition in treatment households proved to be pretty close to what actually 
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happened, as will be discussed further along in this chapter.  Table 3.4 provides a 
summary of the treatment groups and the initial number of households in each. 
Treatment Group Comparison Level  
Initial Number of 
Households 
1 Neighborhood  75 
2 Street  75 
3 Next Door Neighbors  75 
Table 3.4  Treatment Groups for Home Energy Report Experiment 
The master database of houses, provided by the housing office at Andrews, included 770 
houses.  However, not all 770 houses could participate in the experiment.  Some of the 
houses were unoccupied during certain months of the experiment.  Some of the houses 
had no metered data or faulty meters.  Some of the houses were designated for general 
officers and were not eligible for treatment, so as to not risk disruption to the experiment 
if a high-ranking officer took issue with their home energy report.  There were only eight 
general officer residences, so this did not lead to a significant reduction in eligible homes 
for the experiment. 
With regard to occupancy, only the data from houses that were fully occupied for the 
entire duration of the experiment were analyzed as treatment or control households.  This 
ensures that homes only partially occupied during a given month will not be unfairly 
compared to homes occupied for the entire month.  It also ensures that all the homes 
analyzed in the experiment had the same occupants during all four months of the 
experiment.  In order to remove unoccupied or partially occupied homes from the 
analysis, the housing office at Joint Base Andrews provided the necessary occupancy 
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data.  In fact, for the month of June, the occupancy data also included forecasted moves 
for the coming months.  This allowed for the removal of probable movers before making 
selections of treatment and control households, thereby reducing the number of treatment 
and control homes that would have to be thrown out during the course of the experiment 
due to a move. 
With regard to problematic meters, no additional data was required from the housing 
office.  Some of the usage data simply contained blanks or “0” as the electricity 
consumption for certain homes.  These homes were removed from the analysis.  Also any 
home that was double listed with two differing meter reads or a reading of less than 50 
kWh was considered unrealistic and removed from the analysis.  This value was chosen 
after graphing the distribution of June electricity usage and noticing a reasonable 
breaking point around 50 kWh. 
Removing homes from the dataset as described in the preceding paragraphs led to a 
dataset of homes that were eligible for the home energy report experiment, either as 
treatment or control homes.  This dataset of eligible homes included 601 homes, which 
means that 169 homes were removed from the master dataset of 770 homes for the 
reasons described above.  From this dataset of eligible homes, a random selection process 
was done to select homes for each of the three treatment groups and the remaining homes 
were automatically considered part of the control group.  Table 3.5 shows the number of 
homes included in each treatment group and the control group and shows the total 






Initial Number of 
Homes 
1 Neighborhood 75 
2 Street 75 
3 Next-Door Neighbor 75 
Control ----- 376 
  
Total:  601 
Table 3.5  Treatment and Control Groups for Home Energy Report Experiment 
But homes still had to be randomly placed into these experiment groups.  To accomplish 
this, each of the 601 eligible homes was assigned a random number between zero and 
one.  The list of homes was then sorted by ascending random number and the first 75 
homes were placed as members of the first experiment group, the “Neighborhood” level 
of comparison.  The next 75 homes were placed as members of the second experiment 
group, the “Street” level of comparison.  The next 75 homes were placed as members of 
the third experiment group, the “Next-Door Neighbor” level of comparison.  The 
remaining 376 homes were placed as members of the control group. 
The following list summarizes this process of randomly selecting homes to participate in 
the experiment. 
1. Import June electricity usage data into master dataset of homes 
2. Delete homes with no meters or faulty meters 
3. Delete general officer quarters 
4. Delete homes with projected moves during course of experiment 
5. Assign random number to each remaining home 
6. Sort in ascending order by random number 
7. Place first 75 homes in “Neighborhood” comparison group 
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8. Place second 75 homes in “Street” comparison group 
9. Place third 75 homes in “Next-Door Neighbor” comparison group 
10. Place remaining 376 homes in control group 
While 601 homes were initially considered as part of the experiment, this number 
decreased as the experiment progressed.  This reduction in the number of homes was due 
to two reasons.  First, even though households forecasted to move during the experiment 
were removed from the list of eligible homes, some additional households moved during 
the course of the experiment.  This reduced the number of homes included, although not 
nearly to the degree it would have if the forecasted moves had not been initially removed.  
Second, during the last month of the experiment (September), the data provided no longer 
included electricity usage data for a batch of recently built homes.  Presumably, some 
meter problems had developed with those homes, so they had to be removed from the 
usage data and, consequently, the experiment.  The homes removed for this were evenly 
spread through the different experiment groups. 
By the end of the experiment, 475 homes remained as eligible for analysis.  These homes 
persisted through the duration of the experiment with the same occupants and functioning 
meters.  Table 3.6 provides the initial and final numbers of homes involved in the 




Initial Number of 
Homes 
Final Number of 
Homes 
1 Neighborhood 75 58 
2 Street 75 60 
3 Next-Door Neighbor 75 63 
Control ----- 376 294 
  
Total:  601 Total:  475 
Table 3.6  Initial and Final Number of Homes in Experiment 
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It should also be noted that just because a home was removed from the dataset of homes 
eligible for analysis in the experiment, they were not necessarily excluded from the 
experiment altogether.  They were still necessary for the sake of comparing the electricity 
consumption of treatment homes via the home energy reports.  This clarification applies 
only to the homes that were removed from the list of eligible homes due to a lack of 
consistent occupancy throughout the experiment.  If a home had only partial occupancy 
during a particular month because the occupants switched out, the home was removed 
from inclusion in the treatment or control groups.  However, if that home had full 
occupancy during the following month, its electricity usage for that month would be 
included in calculating the average electricity usage for its neighborhood and street.  It 
would also be included in calculating the next-door neighbor average electricity usage if 
it was within two occupied homes of one of the treatment homes in that comparison 
category.  So, essentially, while the homes of projected movers and actual movers were 
not eligible for inclusion in the treatment and control groups, any home that had full 
occupancy for any given month of the experiment was still included in the calculations of 
average electricity usage for that month, whether at the neighborhood, street, or next-door 
neighbor level.    
3.3.2 Generation and Mailing of Home Energy Reports 
The monthly electricity usage data and occupancy data was provided by the housing 
office at Joint Base Andrews.  Once this data was received, it would take three to four 
days to generate and mail the home energy reports for that month.  The process began 
with removing households from the dataset that moved out during the month and adding 
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back into the dataset households that had moved in during the previous month.  Then, the 
electricity usage data was imported into the dataset and the average electricity usages for 
each neighborhood and street on the base were calculated.  Also, the average electricity 
usages of the most efficient 20% of households in each neighborhood and on each street 
were calculated.  For the next-door neighbor calculations, the maps of the base were 
referenced to determine the nearest two occupied homes on each side of each home in the 
“Next-Door Neighbor” comparison category, and the average electricity usage of these 
four homes was calculated. 
All these averages were used in the generation of the customized home energy reports for 
all of the treatment households.  Each report was individually generated by entering into 
a Microsoft Excel file the values for:  the treatment household’s electricity usage for that 
month, the average electricity usage of the neighborhood or street, and the average 
electricity usage of the most efficient 20% of households in the neighborhood or on the 
street.  The file would then create a horizontal bar chart that was cut and pasted into a 
Microsoft Word file.  There were nine different such Microsoft Word files, one for each 
of the possible combinations of comparison categories and performance categories, as 
previously shown in Figure 3.5.  Once the bar chart was inserted, the customization of the 
report was finalized by including the address at the top and updating a sentence near the 
top of the report that stated the household’s electricity usage as a percentage above or 
below other neighbors.  If the household was a “Great” performer, the sentence stated the 
percentage of electricity consumed below the average of the most efficient neighbors in 
the comparison group.  If the household was a “Good” performer, the sentence stated the 
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percentage of electricity consumed above the most efficient neighbors in the comparison 
group.  If the household was a “More than Average” performer, the sentence stated the 
percentage of electricity consumed above all neighbors in the comparison group. 
Once all the reports were generated, they were printed in color.  The cover letter for that 
month was updated and printed in color as well.  Then the mailings were stuffed into the 
envelopes.  The address for each report was printed on the back of the report itself so that 
when folded it would display through the window on the envelope. 
The June data was used to generate the June home energy reports, which were mailed on 
July 13.  The July data was used to generate the July home energy reports, which were 
mailed on August 24.  The August data was used to generate the August home energy 
reports, which were mailed on September 18.  Unfortunately, none of the mailings were 
able to go out during the first few days of the month.  For the first mailing, this was due 
mostly to working out the details of generating the reports for the first time.  For the 
second and third mailings, which were mailed even further into the month, this was due 
to delays in receiving the data, which were the results of a transition in leadership at the 
housing office at Joint Base Andrews.  These delays do not impact the ability of the 
experiment results to answer the research questions.  The fact that the mailings did not 
get our earlier in the month simply means that the analysis should not interpret 
differences from month to month as being significant because the time after treatment 
varied from month to month.  The analysis should focus on the cumulative impact of all 
three mailings across the different treatment groups.  
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Chapter 4:  Home Energy Report Experiment Results and Analysis 
The home energy report experiment, as described in the previous chapter, allows us to 
test two different variations of the normative feedback model.  First, we are interested in 
determining whether normative feedback for residential energy consumption will still 
produce energy savings even when the residents are not billed for their energy 
consumption.  Second, we are interested in determining whether increasing the proximity 
of the comparison group from neighborhood, to street, to next-door neighbor, will create 
significant differences in energy savings.  This chapter will analyze the results of the 
experiment and then interpret those results in relation to these two variations of the 
normative feedback model. 
4.1 Experiment Results 
The home energy report experiment was conducted from June through September of 
2012 at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland.  It involved mailing customized home energy 
reports to 225 treatment households.  As anticipated, by the end of the experiment, due to 
moves and some faulty meters, there remained 181 treatment households.  The control 
group decreased in size from 376 to 294 for the same reasons.  The treatment homes 
received home energy reports specific to one of the three treatment categories, which 
varied in terms of the level of comparison contained in the report.  Because the 
experiment involved three rounds of mailings, it generated three sets of observations on 
each household included in the experiment.  These observations consisted of electricity 
usage data for the months of July, August, and September.  Table 4.1 shows the total 
number of observations in each experiment category over the course of those three 
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months.  It should be noted that the only observations that are counted here and that will 
be analyzed in this research are from those homes that had consistent occupancy and 
functioning meters throughout the entire experiment.  If the occupants of a particular 
home, whether in a treatment category or the control group, moved during the course of 










1 Neighborhood 75 58 174 
2 Street 75 60 180 
3 Next-Door Neighbor 75 63 189 
Control ----- 376 294 882 
  
Total:  601 Total:  475 Total:  1,425 
Table 4.1  Total Number of Observations Over Three Months 
Before investigating differences between treatment groups, we want to get a general idea 
of the energy consumption behavior of the residents of Joint Base Andrews during the 
experiment.  Focusing on the 475 homes with enduring occupancy throughout the four 
months of the experiment, we can generate the graph in Figure 4.1, which shows average 




Figure 4.1  Impact of Weather on Monthly Electricity Consumption 
This chart gives us an idea of the range of electricity consumption by the households 
involved in the experiment.  It also shows us that variations in weather make a significant 
impact on electricity consumption.  In the summer of 2012, July was a remarkably hot 
month, and the associated increase in the use of air conditioning and increase in 
electricity consumption is evident on the chart.  And as the weather began cooling off 
into September, the electricity consumption began to decline.  Of course, if the 
experiment carried on into the winter and if we were monitoring overall energy 
consumption to include natural gas, we would see the energy consumption begin to rise 
again as the autumn weather transitioned to winter weather and residents would put their 
furnaces into increasing levels of service. 
The important issue, however, for this research is the difference between categories of 















Average Monthly Electricity Usage  
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treatment and control households, and it includes all the time periods in the experiment to 
include pre-treatment (June) and post-treatment (July through September).  These 
distinctions must be sorted out and analyzed in order to determine the impact of the home 
energy reports across the different treatment groups, and in so doing to test our 
hypotheses. 
While the quantification of the weather impact will be discussed in more detail further 
along in this chapter, it is important at this point to address the ability of a controlled, 
randomized experiment to account for the variations in weather that naturally occurred 
during the course of the home energy report experiment.  The weather variations could 
lead to complications in analyzing the difference between pre-treatment and post-
treatment observations, because of the huge impact weather has on monthly electricity 
consumption.  The important aspect of the home energy report experiment that solves this 
problem is the existence of the control group.  The households in the control group and in 
the treatment groups are all subject to the same weather each month.  So, by analyzing 
the differences in electricity consumption between the control group and the treatment 
groups, we should be able to determine the impact of the treatment, distinct from the 
impact of the weather, in any of the treatment months (July through September).  This 




















Neighborhood µN1 µN2 µN3 µN µC - µN (µC - µN)/µC 
Street µS1 µS2 µS3 µS µC - µS (µC - µS)/µC 
Next Door 
Neighbors 
µND1 µND2 µND3 µND µC - µND (µC - µND)/µC 
Control µC1 µC2 µC3 µC --- --- 
Table 4.2  Calculation of Average Energy Savings 
The other important aspect of this type of controlled experiment is that the households 
have to be randomly divided between the treatment and control groups.  This ensures that 
there are no inherent characteristics in any particular group that incline it to behave 
differently than other groups in terms of electricity consumption.  Such inherent 
characteristics, if not accounted for, can bias the experiment one way or the other, 
distorting the results, and leading to inaccurate conclusions.  For these reasons, the 
households in the home energy report experiment were placed into treatment and control 
groups in a random process, described in Chapter 3.  It was expected that this 
randomization would avoid inherent differences between groups, and that the equality of 
the groups would be evidenced by equal, or close to equal, electricity consumption across 
all three treatment groups and the control group during the pre-treatment month (June).  
As will be shown, this pre-treatment equality was not as strong as would have been 
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desirable, so the simple analysis of Table 4.2 will not suffice, and it will be important to 
conduct the analysis in a way that takes any pre-treatment differences into account. 
We should first examine the raw values of average electricity usage for each month by 
each experiment group.  Table 4.3 provides these basic results. 
  
 





















Neighborhood 58 1004 1422 1213 861 1165 
Street 60 955 1336 1210 804 1116 
Next-Door Neighbor 63 1066 1466 1330 957 1251 
Control 294 1051 1491 1353 962 1268 
Table 4.3  Average Monthly Electricity Usage by Experiment Group 
If we were to analyze only the post-treatment months and calculate savings based simply 
on the differences between the average electricity usages of the different treatment groups 
compared to the control group, we would want to examine a chart that includes 




Figure 4.2  Post-Treatment Average Monthly Electricity Usage by Experiment Group 
Examining this chart alone, we see that the average monthly electricity usage of the 
“Neighborhood” and “Street” level comparisons was significantly lower than the average 
monthly electricity usage of the control group during the three months after treatment 
began (July through September).  We could conclude that the home energy reports had a 
significant impact when their comparisons of electricity consumption were made at the 
“Neighborhood” and “Street” level, with the “Street” level generating the most savings.  
We could also conclude that the comparisons made at the “Next-Door Neighbor” level 
did not have a significant impact, with the electricity usage of that treatment group being 
almost the same as that of the control group.  A statistical analysis of these observations 





































































Neighborhood 58 174 1165 447 103 8.12% 0.0081 
Street 60 180 1116 463 152 11.98% 0.0001 
Next-Door Neighbor 63 189 1251 495 18 1.39% 0.6750 
Control 294 882 1268 535 --- --- --- 
Table 4.4  Average Electricity Savings by Experiment Group 
The P-Values shown resulted from two-tailed, two-sample t-test procedures comparing 
each treatment group to the control group.  The statistical significance indicated by these 
results is consistent with the confidence intervals shown on the chart in Figure 4.2.  This 
analysis would indicate a significant savings of almost 12% from comparisons made at 
the “Street” level, a significant savings of just over 8% at the “Neighborhood” level, and 
a non-significant savings of over 1% produced at the “Next-Door Neighbor” level.  But 
these conclusions assume that the randomization process in which the households were 
separated into the different treatment and control groups succeeded in establishing 
experiment groups with equivalent electricity usages during the pre-treatment time 
period.  To determine whether this was the case or not, we need to examine the average 
electricity usage of each experiment group during the pre-treatment month of June.  




Figure 4.3  Pre-Treatment Average Monthly Electricity Usage by Experiment Group 
This chart could be interpreted in one of two ways.  It could be concluded that no 
significant differences existed between the experiment groups during the pre-treatment 
month, and therefore we do not need to consider the pre-treatment data in our analysis of 
energy savings.  We can simply use the post-treatment data to compare the treatment 
groups to the control group and calculate the savings associated with each treatment 
group, as we did in Table 4.4.  However, the more conservative approach would be to 
recognize that differences do indeed exist in the pre-treatment electricity usage of the 
experiment groups.  While these differences may not be statistically significant, they still 
suggest the existence of inherent differences between the groups in terms of electricity 
consumption characteristics.  The next section provides a more thorough analysis of the 














































4.2 Analysis of Results 
This section builds on the initial analysis begun in the previous section by determining 
the amount of electricity savings for each treatment category, while taking into 
consideration the pre-treatment differences in electricity consumption that existed 
between the experiment groups.  This will be accomplished through two approaches.  The 
first will be through a differences-in-differences analysis and the second will be through a 
regression analysis.  Both approaches will essentially consider the electricity usage of the 
pre-treatment month (June) as a baseline from which to measure changes resulting from 
the home energy report experiment.  The results of both approaches will be presented 
together at the end of this section, and they should provide a more complete 
understanding of whether the different treatment categories generated different levels of 
electricity savings. 
4.2.1 Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
A controlled experiment has the potential of eliminating pre-treatment differences 
between experiment groups.  In the case of our home energy report experiment, however, 
the randomization did not succeed in establishing experiment groups with equal, or very 
close to equal, electricity consumption.  So we need a method of analysis that can handle 
the fact that each experiment group had a different starting point, or baseline, going into 
the experiment.  A differences-in-differences approach allows us to do that. 
The differences-in-differences approach requires us to make one reasonable assumption.  
If the experiment groups demonstrated different electricity consumptions during the pre-
treatment month of June, these differences resulted from a number of unobserved 
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differences.  These differences in human behaviors, orientation of the homes, sizes of the 
homes, floorplans, and unit types all contribute to the differences in electricity 
consumption.  In order to use the differences-in-differences approach, we must assume 
that, in absence of any treatment, these unobserved differences would remain the same 
over time (Manning, 2012).  This assumption is clearly valid for all the physical 
differences related to the homes themselves, as the homes included in each experiment 
group do not change throughout the course of the experiment.  And with regard to 
behavioral differences between the groups, the assumption is quite reasonable, because 
the occupants also remain the same throughout the course of the experiment.  It is 
reasonable to assume that their energy consumption behaviors would remain the same in 
the absence of treatment. 
An explanation of the differences-in-differences approach will make clear the necessity 
of the assumption we have just made.  For the sake of simplicity, we will briefly discuss 
just one hypothetical treatment group and compare it to a control group.  The difference 
between the treatment group and the control group during the pre-treatment time period, 
in terms of the variable of interest, can be considered the “normal” difference between 
the two groups.  This “normal” difference is the result of inherent differences between the 
two groups.  Assuming this “normal” difference would remain constant in the absence of 
treatment, as discussed in the previous paragraph, we can compare it with the difference 
observed after treatment to give us the change in the variable of interest that is due only 
to the impact of the treatment.  The graph in Figure 4.4 helps to clarify the approach.  If 
the analysis were being conducted with only post-treatment data, one would simply 
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consider the distance AB as the treatment effect.  However, given that a pre-treatment 
difference exists between the treatment and control groups, we can project that 
difference, represented by the distance CB, into the post-treatment time period.  Then, 
subtracting the distance CB from the distance AB yields the actual treatment effect 
(Manning, 2012).  This differences-in-differences approach essentially subtracts the pre-
treatment difference from the post-treatment difference to determine the treatment effect. 
 
Figure 4.4  The Differences-in-Differences Approach (Manning, 2012) 
Applying this approach to the home energy report experiment, we begin by calculating 
the difference between the pre-treatment electricity usage and the post-treatment 
electricity usage for each household.  By examining each household and then folding the 
results together, we can obtain the average difference between pre- and post-treatment 
electricity usages for each experiment category.  Then we can compare each treatment 
category to the control category, calculating the difference in that direction to get the 
results we need.  We begin with the raw values for monthly electricity consumption from 
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Table 4.3.  A revised version of that table that calculates the average change in electricity 
consumption from the pre-treatment period of June is shown in Table 4.5. 
  
 





















Neighborhood 58 418 209 -143 161 
Street 60 381 255 -151 162 
Next-Door Neighbor 63 400 264 -109 185 
Control 294 440 302 -89 217 
Table 4.5  Differences Between Pre- and Post-Treatment Electricity Consumption 
Note that there is now no column for June data.  This is because the June consumption 
values have been subtracted from the consumption values for each of the treatment 
months.  From the table above, we notice again that July was a particularly hot month 
during the summer of 2012, as indicated by the large increase in electricity consumption 
compared to the month of June.  September represents the coolest month of the 
experiment as the electricity usage during that month fell below the electricity usage 
during June, and this is reflected in the negative values in the Table 4.5. 
To help visualize this information and attach confidence intervals to the analysis, Figure 




Figure 4.5  Difference Between Pre- and Post-Treatment Electricity Consumption 
We can now reference Table 4.5 in calculating the differences-in-differences by 
subtracting the difference between pre-and post-treatment electricity usage for each 
treatment group from 217 kWh, which is the difference between pre- and post-treatment 
electricity usage for the control group.  This calculation and the associated statistical 

















Neighborhood 174 161 364 55.8 4.5% 0.0480 
Street 180 162 341 55.2 4.5% 0.0450 
Next Door Neighbor 189 185 327 32.0 2.6% 0.2325 
Control 882 217 335 --- --- --- 












































The values for savings in the above table were calculated by comparing the differences-
in-differences for each treatment category to the average electricity usage for all 
households during the three months of treatment, which was 1,234 kWh.  This value was 
used instead of the average electricity usage of just the control group because of the 
differing pre-treatment consumptions values already discussed.  That is, if the 
consumption levels of the control group were inherently higher than the treatment groups, 
it does not make sense to account for that through the differences-in-differences analysis, 
but then use the control group average alone to calculate resulting savings.  It makes 
more sense to use the average electricity consumption of all homes involved in the 
experiment, both treatment and control.  The P-Values in the above table were generated 
through two-sided t-tests that compared the difference between pre- and post-treatment 
for each treatment category to the difference between pre- and post-treatment for the 
control category, using the associated number of observations and standard deviations.  It 
should be noted that no statistically significant differences existed in the savings between 
the three treatment groups. 
These results demonstrate a similar pattern to the previous results reported in Table 4.4, 
when we only analyzed the post-treatment electricity usage.  Now that we have accounted 
for the differences in pre-treatment electricity usage, we see that once again, the 
“Neighborhood” and “Street” levels of comparison generated significant amounts of 
savings, while the “Next-Door Neighbor” level of comparison did not.  However, the 
amount of savings generated by both the “Neighborhood” and “Street” levels of 
comparison has decreased substantially, down to 4.5%.  This percentage of savings is 
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more consistent with that typically found in the literature related to changes in energy 
consumption behaviors.  We also no longer see a distinction in the amount of savings 
generated between the “Neighborhood” and “Street” levels, whereas before, the “Street” 
level of comparison generated higher savings. 
4.2.2 Regression Analysis 
The differences-in-differences analysis allowed us to calculate the electricity savings 
associated with each treatment category, while taking into consideration the pre-treatment 
differences.  But we may be able to further improve the analysis.  The pre-treatment 
differences in electricity consumption reflect the existence of inherent differences 
between the experiment groups in terms of energy consumption behaviors, sizes of the 
homes, neighborhoods, and unit types.  A regression analysis will allow us to analyze the 
treatment impact while controlling for some of these inherent differences between 
experiment categories, not just in terms of their pre-treatment existence, but also in terms 
of their influence throughout the treatment months.  It will also allow us to control for the 
monthly variations in weather that occurred throughout the experiment. 
4.2.2.1 Identifying the Dependent Variable 
The first step in the regression analysis is to determine the dependent and independent 
variables.  The dependent variable will need to be a measure of electricity usage and will 
need to account for the differences in pre-treatment usage.  Accordingly, we will use the 
monthly difference from June electricity consumption for each household as our 
dependent variable.  By accounting for pre-treatment differences in this way, we can 
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proceed with the regression analysis, focusing especially on the post-treatment 
differences in electricity consumption between treatment groups and the control group, 
having already accounted for the differences in pre-treatment consumption.  This 
dependent variable can be calculated simply by subtracting the June electricity usage for 
each house from that house’s electricity usage in each of the treatment months.  This 
results in three observations for each household in the experiment, one for each of the 
three treatment months (July through September). 
Using this “Difference from June” as our dependent variable reflects an interest not in 
controlling for how the independent variables caused the differences in pre-treatment 
consumption, but in how those variables caused differences in post-treatment 
consumption.  This is why the regression analysis is needed – to control for the ways in 
which other factors besides the home energy reports influenced the observed changes in 
electricity consumption during the course of the experiment.  Some of these factors, such 
as home size, might have different mechanisms for influencing the change in 
consumption, and those different mechanisms might even have somewhat off-setting 
influences.  For instance, the increase in electricity consumption by a larger home during 
a hot month will be more than the associated increase by a smaller home.  But, if the 
occupants of a larger home make efforts to conserve energy and lower their thermostat, 
they can generate a higher quantity of electricity savings than can the occupants of a 
smaller home who make an identical thermostat adjustment.  So, a particular larger home 
could experience these off-setting influences in any given month.  The point of this 
regression analysis is not to parse out how these different mechanisms might be 
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influencing changes in electricity consumption, but rather to identify the influencing 
variables and control for them.  This will allow us to see more clearly the impact of the 
home energy reports without the varying compositions of the experiment groups clouding 
the picture. 
Having identified the dependent variable, we now need to take a look at the basic 
statistical descriptives of the dependent variable.  Table 4.7 provides these descriptives 
for “Difference from June” for each of the three treatment months.  It is evident that, as 
we have noted previously, weather has a dominating impact.  We see that the average 
electricity usage in July, the hottest month of the experiment, was 424 kWh higher than 
the average electricity usage in June.  We see that the average electricity usage in 
September, the coolest month of the experiment, was 106 kWh lower than the average 
electricity usage in June. 
  











July 475 424 263 -741 1586 
August 475 279 251 -860 1288 
September 475 -106 250 -1480 1130 
Overall 1425 199 339 -1480 1586 
Table 4.7  Difference from June Electricity Usage by Month 
4.2.2.2 Identifying the Independent Variables 
In identifying the independent variables for the regression analysis, two primary criteria 
were used.  First, each independent variable needed to have a likelihood of influencing 
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the dependent variable of “Difference from June.”  This is standard for any regression 
analysis.  In this case, we needed to identify those variables that would impact not 
necessarily the monthly electricity usage of a household, but more particularly, the 
change in the household’s electricity usage as compared to the baseline month of June.  
And second, the variables needed to vary in their values or amounts across the different 
experiment groups.  This connects to the purpose of running this regression analysis.  
That is, we are interested in controlling for variables that may not be equally represented 
in the different experiment groups in order to make a more accurate assessment of the 
impact of the different home energy reports. 
So, what variables meet these criteria to be included in the regression analysis?  In a 
broad sense, the physical features of the house itself, the occupants within the house, and 
the weather, all influence the monthly electricity consumption of the house and may exist 
in variation across the different experiment groups.  The ensuing paragraphs will step 
through each of the independent variables that will be used in the regression analysis. 
The physical features of the house, such as its size and whether it is a single family home, 
a duplex, or a townhome, significantly influence how much electricity is used in the 
home, particularly how much energy is required to heat or cool the home.  More to the 
point of this regression analysis, however, the physical features influence the amount of 
electricity savings that a household can generate during a given month.  The first physical 
feature of the house to be included as an independent variable in the regression analysis is 
the home size.  Any difference between the experiment groups in terms of average home 
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size should have an impact on the average electricity usage of that experiment group, 
because bigger homes require more electricity to cool during the summer months. 
We also need to examine whether home size exists in variation across the different 
experiment groups.  Table 4.8 shows the average home sizes in square feet along with the 










Neighborhood 58 1645 393 
Street 60 1622 357 
Next-Door Neighbor 63 1695 439 
Control 294 1642 418 
Table 4.8  Variation in Average Home Size across Experiment Groups 
From this table, we clearly see the existence of differences in home size between the 
groups.  The “Next-Door Neighbor” category of comparison contained the largest home 
sizes, being on average 73 square feet larger than the homes in the “Street” category of 
comparison, which contained the smallest home sizes.  This represents more than a 4% 
difference in home size.  The other two experiment groups are in the middle of the range 
and quite comparable to each other. 
The second physical feature of the home that impacts changes in energy consumption is 
the unit type.  This refers to whether the home is a single family home, a duplex, or a 
townhouse.  The bigger the home, the more energy is required to heat it or cool it.  And a 
home that is connected to other homes, such as in a duplex or townhome unit, will not 
require as much energy to heat or cool, because the connecting units will act as 
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insulation, reducing the number of sides of the home that are exposed to the outdoor 
temperatures.  End-unit townhouses are considered as duplexes in this analysis, because 
the relevance of considering unit type as an independent variable has to do with how 
many sides of the home are exposed to the outdoor elements.  Put more precisely, out of 
the four sides of a standard home, if all four sides are exposed, the home was considered 
a single family home.  If three sides were exposed, it was considered a duplex, so this 
would include townhouse end-units.  And if only two sides were exposed, it was 
considered a townhouse. 
To evaluate the inclusion of unit type as an independent variable in the regression 
analysis, Table 4.9 below provides the average “Difference from June” electricity usage 












Townhouse 261 187 349 
Duplex 969 196 322 
Single Family 195 232 401 
Table 4.9  Difference from June Electricity Usage by Unit Type 
This table shows that the single family units used, on average, 232 kWh more electricity 
each month as compared to the amount of electricity those same single family units used 
in the baseline month of June.  This difference is 36 kWh more than the difference 
observed in the duplex unit types and 45 kWh more than the difference observed in the 
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townhouse unit types.  So, we observe that the unit type of a household seems to have 
influenced the changes in that household’s electricity consumption over the course of the 
home energy report experiment. 
We also need to examine whether unit type is a factor that varies across the experiment 
groups in terms of their composition.  Table 4.10 breaks down the differences between 
the experiment groups by unit type, providing the number of homes in each experiment 








Townhome Duplex/End Unit 
Single Family 
Home 
Number % Number % Number % 
Neighborhood 58 14 24.1% 36 62.1% 8 13.8% 
Street 60 14 23.3% 38 63.3% 8 13.3% 
Next-Door 
Neighbor 
63 10 15.9% 44 69.8% 9 14.3% 
Control 294 49 16.7% 205 69.7% 40 13.6% 
Table 4.10  Variation in Unit Type across Experiment Groups 
In this simplified version of a frequency table, we see a good distribution of single family 
homes amongst the four experiment groups, with each of the groups comprised of 
between 13-14% single family homes.  However, with the other two unit types, the 
distribution is not as good, though no alarming problems are observed.  The 
“Neighborhood” and “Street” level experiment groups contain a higher percentage of 
townhomes than duplexes, and the “Next-Door Neighbor” level and control group 
contain a higher percentage of duplexes than townhomes. 
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Another independent variable we need to include in the regression analysis is the 
neighborhood in which each house resides.  The neighborhoods on Joint Base Andrews 
are established based on the rank of the occupants.  Senior officers live in one 
neighborhood; junior officers in another.  Senior non-commissioned officers live in one 
neighborhood; junior non-commissioned officers live in another.  Table 4.11 shows how 
the neighborhoods on Joint Base Andrews are broken down by rank, with “O” being the 
standard designation in the military for commissioned officers, and “E” being the 
standard designation for enlisted members.  The associated numbers represent levels of 
rank within either the officer or enlisted rank structure. 
Neighborhood Rank 
Adams Circle O4-O5 
Airey Court E9 
Cleveland Square Unaccompanied 
Fairway Drive E8-E9 
Jefferson Village E5-E8/O3-O5 
Lincoln Place E5-E8 
Madison Cove E5-E8 
Monroe Gardens E5-E6 
Roosevelt Court E5-E8 
Truman Place Unaccompanied 
Wilson Square E5-E6 
Table 4.11  Breakdown of Neighborhoods on Joint Base Andrews by Rank 
This table demonstrates that each neighborhood has a somewhat unique makeup of 
residents, in terms of rank.  Some neighborhoods contain residents within a fairly tight 
band of rank, while others have a more inclusive range.  Some, such as Jefferson Village, 
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contain both officers and enlisted, though in different sections within the neighborhood.  
The “Unaccompanied” neighborhoods are for residents who are not accompanied by a 
family, and will likely have different energy consumption characteristics than the other 
neighborhoods that contain families.  These neighborhoods also contain a mixture of 
ranks. 
Now, to evaluate the appropriateness of including neighborhood as an independent 
variable in the regression analysis, Table 4.12 provides the average “Difference from 












Adams Circle 84 208 468 
Airey Court 15 252 280 
Cleveland Square 147 187 382 
Fairway Drive 36 196 372 
Jefferson Village 240 225 310 
Lincoln Place 114 229 460 
Madison Cove 6 274 363 
Monroe Gardens 297 145 282 
Roosevelt Court 327 184 266 
Truman Place 33 292 372 
Wilson Square 126 265 372 
Table 4.12  Difference from June Electricity Usage by Neighborhood 
The values of the dependent variable, “Difference from June” range from 145 kWh in 
Monroe Gardens to 292 kWh in Truman Place.  This represents slightly more than a 
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100% difference, providing reason for the regression analysis to include neighborhood as 
an independent variable that wields influence on the dependent variable. 
But we also need to take a look at the amount of variation across the experiment groups 



















# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Neighborhood 58 4 6.9 0 0.0 6 10.3 3 5.2 10 17.2 5 8.6 
Street 60 3 5.0 0 0.0 7 11.7 4 6.7 8 13.3 4 6.7 
Next-Door 
Neighbor 
63 5 7.9 1 1.6 7 11.1 0 0.0 12 19.0 7 11.1 











Square   
  
# % # % # % # % # % 
  
  
0 0.0 15 25.9 11 19.0 0 19.0 4 0.0 
  
  
0 0.0 10 16.7 15 25.0 1 25.0 8 1.7 
  
  
0 0.0 10 15.9 14 15.9 2 22.2 5 3.2 
  
  
2 0.7 64 21.8 69 21.8 8 23.5 25 2.7 
  
Table 4.13  Variation in Neighborhood Composition across Experiment Groups 
The most important thing to note about this table is that many of the neighborhoods are 
not evenly represented across the four experiment categories.  Even one of the most 
populated neighborhoods, Monroe Gardens, makes up 25.9% of the “Neighborhood” 
group, but it makes up only 15.9% of the control group.  These differences between 
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experiment groups further validate the inclusion of neighborhood as an independent 
variable in the regression analysis. 
Beyond the homes and neighborhoods, the monthly variations in weather also influence 
the monthly electricity consumption.  Some method of quantifying the monthly weather 
must be employed to generate an independent variable that will control for weather 
variations in the regression analysis.  The use of cooling degree days (CDD) will 
accomplish this objective.  A CDD is an indicating measure of how much cooling energy 
is required due to the weather during a given time period.  The actual units of a CDD 
measurement are degree∙days.  For this research, the CDD calculations were made on a 
monthly basis to match the duration of time over which the electricity meters were read.  
The amount of CDDs in a given month is calculated one day at a time.  For each day, the 
difference between the average daily temperature and the established base temperature is 
calculated.  Typically, and in this research, 65° is used as the base temperature.  This base 
temperature figures from assuming 75° as an ideal indoor air temperature and then 
subtracting 10° to account for internal heat gain.  Once the difference between average 
daily temperature and the base temperature is calculated for each day of the month, those 
values are added together to establish the amount of CDDs for the month.  These values 
for the four months of the home energy report experiment for Joint Base Andrews in 










Table 4.14  Cooling Degree∙Days During Experiment 
This weather data needs to be included as an independent variable in the regression 
analysis because of its strong influence on the amount of electricity consumed by the 
homes, as shown previously in Figure 4.1. 
The final independent variable that needs to be included in the regression analysis is the 
experiment group to which each household is assigned, which represents the variable of 
interest.  This is the variable that will allow for conclusions to be drawn as to how the 
different categories of comparison in the home energy reports impacted energy 
consumption behavior in the experiment households. 
4.2.2.3 Regression Results 
A regression analysis will help identify how each of these independent variables 
influences the dependent variable.  Conducting a regression analysis that can handle a 
combination of continuous and categorical variables requires the use of sophisticated 
statistical analysis software, such as Stata.  The Stata12 version is used in this analysis.  
Before dumping all the variables into a regression analysis, one final component must be 
considered, having to do with the occupants themselves.  In all 475 houses the occupants 
remained the same throughout the duration of the experiment.  This creates a correlation 
between each of the monthly electricity usage values of a given house, because the 
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behaviors and belongings of the occupants have a fairly consistent impact on the 
electricity usage from month to month.  Even when a particular set of occupants attempts 
to change their energy consumption behavior, the amount of electricity saved is 
inevitably connected to their starting point as determined by the previous month’s 
behavior. Therefore, the monthly usage values for each particular house need to be 
connected together in some way in the analysis.  To accomplish this, the “cluster” option 
was employed in Stata as part of the regression command.  A household identifier was 
assigned to each household, and the regression command included a “cluster by” option 
for the household identifier. 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4.15.  The actual Stata output is 
included as Appendix C.  There are several initial observations about these results before 
getting into the variable of interest.  We first note the r-squared value of 0.458.  This tells 
us that the variables included in the regression account for almost half of the variation 
observed in the dependent variable.  While in some disciplines this may seem low, it is 
reasonable that, when human behavior is involved, plenty of room for unexplained 
variation is expected.  So many events and decisions in a given month can impact 
electricity consumption in a household:  hosting a party, a new video game, a new baby, 
















Unit Type   
  Townhouse             ----- 
  Duplex 34.55 (0.270) 




Neighborhood   
  Adams Circle              ----- 
  Airey Court 40.91 (0.502) 
  Cleveland Square -111.26 (0.334) 
  Fairway Drive -42.39 (0.702) 
  Jefferson Village -62.55 (0.400) 
  Lincoln Place -59.76 (0.535) 
  Madison Cove -4.30 (0.974) 
  Monroe Gardens -188.93 (0.096) 
  Roosevelt Court -92.36 (0.294) 
  Truman Place -14.63 (0.910) 








Experiment Group   
  Control              ----- 
  Neighborhood -46.95 (0.180) 
  Street -60.34 (0.025) 




Constant -170.60 (0.403) 
Note:  r
2
 = 0.458; p-values in parentheses 
Figure 4.15  Regression Results for Home Energy Report Experiment 
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An interesting observation is that the variable “House Size” actually has a negative 
coefficient.  It is important to remember that our dependent variable is not monthly 
electricity usage, but it is the “Difference from June” electricity usage.  Going into the 
analysis, it was hard to predict whether this coefficient would end up positive or negative.  
As previously described, a larger household has, for example, more air to cool, but that 
also creates the possibility of more savings from thermostat reductions. 
It should also be noted that the P-values for the neighborhood variable are not at all 
statistically significant.  However, this is due primarily to the low numbers of 
observations within most neighborhoods.  The two largest neighborhoods, Roosevelt 
Court and Monroe Gardens, have the lowest P-values, and thus come the closest to 
obtaining significance.  When an F-test is conducted on the variable of “Neighborhood,” 
the P-value comes out as .0091, indicating that this is a variable with a lot of explanatory 
power that should be included in the regression, even if each individual neighborhood 
lacks a significant P-value. 
A final interesting note is that Monroe Gardens is the neighborhood with the lowest value 
of all the neighborhood coefficients.  This neighborhood is comprised of junior non-
commissioned officers.  These are enlisted members who have typically been in the 
military for six to ten years.  Adams Circle and Airey Court, on the other hand, are where 
the highest-ranking individuals live, and these neighborhoods have the highest 




The most important results associated with this regression analysis are the coefficients 
associated with the different experiment groups.  The “Control” experiment group was 
given a value of zero in the dataset, so that the regression coefficients for the three 
treatment groups would automatically be relevant to the control group.  In this analysis, 
we have indications of different levels of response between the “Neighborhood” level 
comparisons and the “Street” level comparisons.  In the previous differences-in-
differences analysis, we found an almost equal electricity savings of about 55 kWh for 
both of these experiment groups, and only about 32 kWh for the “Next-Door Neighbor” 
level of comparison, as displayed in Table 4.6.  These regression results indicate that 
when we control for other influencing variables, we find that a difference does exist 
between the impact of the “Neighborhood” level comparisons and the “Street” level 
comparisons.  In fact, we find that the “Neighborhood” experiment group lowered its 
electricity consumption by about 47 kWh more than the control group, and the “Street” 
experiment group lowered its electricity consumption by about 60 kWh more than the 
control group.  It should be noted here that, when tested in a follow-on analysis, no 
statistically significant differences existed between the savings of the three treatment 
groups.  And while the amount of savings in the “Neighborhood” and “Next-Door 
Neighbor” categories fall short of statistical significance, the amount of savings in the 
“Street” category obtains statistical significance with a P-value of 0.025.  The regression 
analysis reveals these distinctions and helps separate out the impact of the different 
comparison levels in the home energy reports, particularly the difference between the 
“Neighborhood” and “Street” levels of comparison. 
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4.3 Interpretation of Results 
In order to summarize the results from the preceding sections, Table 4.16 displays the 
results from both the differences-in-differences analysis and the regression analysis.  The 
table presents the electricity savings experienced by each of the treatment groups in the 
experiment, along with the associated P-values to provide an indication of statistical 
significance.  The calculation of savings percentage is based on a comparison to the 



















Neighborhood 55.8 47.0 4.5% 3.8% 0.0480 0.1800 
Street  55.2 60.3 4.5% 4.9% 0.0450 0.0250 
Next-Door  
Neighbors  
32.0 34.7 2.6% 2.8% 0.2325 0.1510 
Table 4.16  Summary of Results from Differences-in-Differences and Regression Analyses 
These results will be used to test the two hypotheses set forth in the preceding chapter.  
Those hypotheses correlate with two variations of the normative feedback model.  The 
first variation involves the absence of financial incentives and the second variation 
involves altering the comparison level of the normative feedback. 
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4.3.1 Variation 1:  Normative Feedback in Absence of Billing System 
The first variation of the normative feedback model is designed to answer the research 
question of whether normative feedback can generative energy savings when applied in 
an environment in which no financial incentive exists for conservation.  The 
neighborhoods on Joint Base Andrews are the ideal place to test this variation because no 
utility billing program currently exists, yet the homes are individually metered, allowing 
for measurement and feedback.  The literature on normative feedback for energy 
conservation focuses exclusively on providing feedback to households who also receive 
regular utility bills.  But the originating research in the field of social norms and 
normative feedback, particularly in the context of alcohol consumption, was conducted in 
settings where no such financial incentives were involved.  Because of this, the 
hypothesis related to this first variation of the normative feedback model stated the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1:  Normative feedback on residential energy consumption will still 
produce positive energy savings even when residents have no financial incentive 
to conserve. 
To put it more precisely in statistical terms, we could state the following, in which µsavings 
stands for the average savings of the treatment groups: 
Null Hypothesis:                 µsavings = 0 
Hypothesis 1:                      µsavings > 0 
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Figure 4.6 depicts the actual results from the home energy report experiment, which 
found electricity savings in the treatment groups of 3.8%.  This overall percentage of 
savings was the same in both the differences-in-differences analysis and the regression 
analysis. 
 
Figure 4.6  Energy Savings of Normative Feedback in Absence of Billing System 
Therefore, we accept our first hypothesis, as the home energy report demonstrated 
positive electricity savings for the treatment households on Joint Base Andrews. 
This result validates the effectiveness of social norms as a tool to modify behavior even 
when no financial incentives or disincentives are associated with the normative feedback 
process.  Furthermore, this result seems to indicate that it is the normative feedback, 
rather than associated monetary savings in utility expenditures, that are causing the 
savings generated by OPOWER’s home energy reports. The residents of Joint Base 
Andrews who received the home energy reports had nothing to gain or lose financially by 
modifying their energy consumption behavior.  While the responses of each household 
varied, with some households actually increasing their relative electricity usage, overall 
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the households that received the home energy reports modified their behavior and 
conserved electricity. 
The implications of this extend beyond the field of social norms.  Future applications of 
normative feedback for energy conservation should not hesitate to target facilities in 
which the occupants do not pay for utility consumption.  This could include providing 
normative feedback to residents of college dormitories, apartment complexes, and even 
office buildings.  More germane to this research, however, is the potential to extend this 
type of normative feedback throughout military family housing.  The Department of 
Defense spends approximately 3.8 billion dollars in a year on facility energy, with 20% 
of those facilities being military family housing (Robyn, 2010).  And even though the 
plan is to implement utility billing throughout military family housing, currently two-
thirds do not have a billing program in place (Jowers, 2012).  As a rough estimate, if 
home energy reports were implemented at these bases, and if this implementation 
resulted in 3.8% savings as experienced in this experiment, approximately 19.3 million 
dollars could be saved each year. 
4.3.2 Variation 2:  Proximity Based Normative Feedback 
The second variation of the normative feedback model varies the proximity of the 
normative feedback.  That is, it varies whether households receiving normative feedback 
via home energy reports were compared to other households in their neighborhood, to 
other households on their street, or to their next-door neighbors.  This variation was 
tested within the same home energy report experiment as was tested the first variation.  
As discussed in the literature review, previous studies have suggested that increasing the 
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proximity of normative feedback will increase the impact of that feedback.  Most 
prominently, a study employed normative feedback regarding hotel room towel reuse.  
Guests were more likely to reuse their towel when exposed to descriptive norms 
regarding the reuse rates of other guests who had stayed in the same room versus other 
guests in general (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  Extending this idea to the 
realm of energy conservation behaviors led to the formation of the second hypothesis.  
The second hypothesis stated the following: 
Hypothesis 2:  Increasing the comparison group proximity in normative feedback 
for residential energy consumption will increase the amount of energy savings. 
Again, putting it more precisely in statistical terms, we could state the following, in 
which µNsavings stands for the electricity savings at the “Neighborhood” level of 
comparison, µSsavings stands for the electricity savings at the “Street” level of comparison, 
and a µNDsavings stands for the electricity savings at the “Next-Door Neighbor” level of 
comparison: 
Null Hypothesis:                  µNsavings = µSsavings = µNDsavings 
Hypothesis 2:                       µNsavings < µSsavings < µNDsavings 
Figure 4.7 depicts the actual results from the home energy report experiment, broken 
down by comparison category.  The percentages used are the ones resulting from the 
regression analysis, in which we controlled for other influencing factors on energy 




Figure 4.7  Energy Savings of Proximity Based Normative Feedback 
This is where we begin to have problems with our second hypothesis.  These results seem 
to somewhat validate and somewhat invalidate the hypothesis that increasing the 
proximity of the comparison will increase the resulting savings.  The “Street” level of 
comparison indeed increased the electricity savings, as compared to the “Neighborhood” 
level, increasing the savings from 3.8% to 4.9%.  This is consistent with the hypothesis 
and seems to indicate that being compared to homes in closer proximity to one’s own 
home gives the socially normative information more strength.  But if that were 
completely true, we would expect that the “Next-Door Neighbor” level, the closest 
proximity of comparison in this experiment, would yield the most savings.  But instead of 
further increasing the savings, the “Next-Door Neighbor” level of comparison actually 
experienced the lowest savings of all three categories, with an electricity savings of just 
2.8%. 
This suggests that another dynamic is at work as the proximity of comparison increases to 
the next-door neighbor level.  The results indicate that if the proximity of comparison 
gets too close, it weakens the impact of the normative feedback.  This unexpected 
phenomenon can perhaps be explained with some help from the field of attribution 
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theory, which originated to explain the reasons and ways in which we try to make sense 
out of our own behaviors and the behaviors of others (Himmelfarb, 1974).  In particular, 
actor-observer bias could play a role in mitigating the impact of the normative feedback 
when the proximity of comparison increased to the next-door neighbor level.  Actor-
observer bias is defined as the human tendency to interpret one’s own actions as resulting 
from situational factors, and interpret the actions of others as resulting from dispositional 
factors.  In this sense, when you are the “actor,” you explain your own behavior in terms 
of the circumstances or situations that impacted the behavior.  When you are the 
“observer,” you explain another’s behavior in terms of the personality or disposition of 
that person (Jones & Nisbett, 1971).  Of particular significance to the interpretation of the 
experimental results, however, is that the manifestation of the actor-observer bias 
requires, of course, the opportunity to make observations of others.  It is in this 
precondition that we find differentiation between the “Next-Door Neighbor” treatment 
group and the other treatment groups.  It is with next-door neighbors that one has the 
most opportunities to make observations, and therefore the most likelihood of the actor-
observer bias manifesting itself. 
As an example, suppose you have a next-door neighbor and on a few different occasions 
he did not mow his grass until the blades were so high that cutting it left clumps of cut 
grass laying throughout his yard.  You explain these observations by concluding that your 
neighbor is lazy and inconsiderate.  You have interpreted your observations of your 
neighbor’s behavior in terms of his disposition or personality.  As for your own actions, 
you have also cut your grass late a time or two, but you explain your late grass-cutting by 
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citing your busy work schedule and sick children.  You have interpreted your own actions 
in terms of your situation. 
How would this actor-observer bias influence the response to the normative feedback 
contained in the home energy reports, particularly at the “Next-Door Neighbor” level?  If 
you have made observations of your next-door neighbors and have explained their 
behaviors in ways that define their personality, you will be more likely to dismiss 
comparisons made to those neighbors.  For instance, if you received a home energy report 
showing that your home consumed more electricity in the past month than the homes of 
your next-door neighbors, your mind might go fairly quickly to the neighbor who did not 
cut his grass.  Receiving feedback that your neighbor’s household is outperforming your 
household in terms of energy efficiency would not fit with your conclusions of your 
neighbor’s laziness and lack of consideration.  To accommodate the new information 
would require a paradigm shift in how you view your neighbor.  This would reduce the 
likelihood of you receiving the feedback well.  You may be inclined to dismiss the 
comparison and not alter your energy consuming behaviors.   
This is, of course, a silly example, but it attempts to flesh out how the actor-observer bias 
could be the mechanism by which the “Next-Door Neighbor” level of comparison 
actually mitigates the electricity savings produced by the home energy reports, rather 
than further increasing them.  The closer proximity of next-door neighbors leads to a 
higher frequency of observation.  With more observations, the actor-observer bias 
strengthens, and the occupant explains the behaviors of next-door neighbors as resulting 
from their dispositions.  This makes it easier to dismiss normative feedback, particularly 
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if it does not seem to align with the previous conclusions regarding the dispositions of the 
neighbors. 
The results from the home energy report experiment indicate that the second hypothesis 
cannot be accepted without revision.  While the second hypothesis is rejected as 
originally crafted, the following revised hypothesis is presented: 
Revised Hypothesis 2:      µNsavings < µSsavings > µNDsavings 
The implication of this portion of the research is that there exists a “sweet spot” in setting 
the proximity of comparisons in normative feedback.  Future applications of normative 
feedback can increase the treatment effect by increasing the proximity of the 
comparisons.  However, if the proximity gets too close, the treatment effect will diminish 
due to the actor-observer bias. 
4.4 Impact of Performance Categorization 
An additional point of analysis in this experiment involves the boomerang effect 
described in the literature review.  The boomerang effect describes the response to 
normative feedback exhibited by those who are already demonstrating the socially 
desirable behavior.  For instance, in the case of home energy consumption, during the 
pre-treatment time period, households are demonstrating either:  1) higher than average 
energy consumption, 2) average energy consumption, or 3) lower than average energy 
consumption.  It is this third group that is already performing in the desired manner – 
their energy consumption is low compared to the average.  For this group, a problem can 
arise in the application of normative feedback.  When these low-consumers receive 
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feedback on the energy consumption of their neighbors and realize their deviation from 
normative behavior, social norms theory would indicate that they may actually increase 
their energy consumption in order to more closely pattern their behavior after that of their 
neighbors.  Obviously, this is not the intended effect of the normative feedback, and this 
is referred to as the boomerang effect. 
As discussed in the literature review, other studies have demonstrated that the inclusion 
of injunctive norms with the normative feedback can eliminate this boomerang effect 
(Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  Injunctive norms simply 
provide some sort of indication of social approval for the desired behavior and 
disapproval for the undesired behavior.  However, these other studies, to include studies 
on the impact of OPOWER’s use of normative feedback, have all occurred in 
environments in which households pay for their metered utility usage and thus have 
financial incentive to maintain low energy consumption.  It is not known whether 
injunctive norms can eliminate the boomerang effect without the presence of such 
financial incentives.  Because the research in this dissertation applied normative feedback 
through home energy reports that contained both descriptive and injunctive norms, it 
provides a unique opportunity to examine whether the boomerang effect can still be 
eliminated through the use of injunctive norms even when no financial incentive exists. 
Such an analysis can be made by focusing attention especially on the group of homes that 
were designated by the performance category of “Great” during the pre-treatment month 
of June.  We will conduct a differences-in-differences analysis to determine whether this 
group altered their energy consuming behaviors, measuring any resulting energy savings 
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or increases.  We will actually conduct the analysis for all three performance groups, 
“Great,” “Good,” and “More Than Average,” but our focus will be on the interpretation 
of the results for the “Great” group, as that is the group that would be inclined to 
demonstrate the boomerang effect. 
Because a household’s performance designation can change from month to month, it is 
only possible to analyze changes demonstrated between the pre-treatment month of June 
and the first month of treatment, which was July.  Besides the fact the performance 
designations shift from month to month, another complicating factor is the timing of the 
report mailings.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the home energy reports were mailed in the 
middle of each month, but the monthly electricity usage data is strictly by calendar 
month.  Thus, after July, the monthly electricity usage data may reflect behavior changes 
resulting from both the first and second mailings, and these mailings could have included 
different performance designations for the subject household. 
In analyzing differences between the different performance categories, as opposed to the 
different comparison categories analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter, it is not 
appropriate to measure the changes in electricity consumption across the different 
performance categories.  This is because there is intended bias built-in to the different 
performance categories.  Homes categorized as “Great” have already demonstrated low 
energy consumption.  Homes categorized as “More than Average” have already 
demonstrated high energy consumption.  To simply compare how the “Great” homes 
respond to treatment versus how the “More than Average” homes respond to treatment 
would blur the analysis, because the different performance categories have actually been 
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categorized based on their electricity usage.  This means the low-consuming homes 
(“Great”) would have a more challenging time finding new ways to conserve energy than 
would the high-consuming homes (“More than Average”). 
Therefore, what is needed is a performance categorization to be assigned to each of the 
homes in the control group.  In this way, the homes categorized as “Great” that received 
treatment can be compared to the homes categorized as “Great” that did not receive 
treatment, and similarly for each of the three performance categories.  This was done and 

















Treatment 23 471 243 
Control 30 334 145 
Good 
Treatment 78 402 226 
Control 121 447 224 
More than 
Average 
Treatment 80 377 305 
Control 142 456 301 
Table 4.17  Differences in Electricity Consumption by Performance Category 
And then calculating the electricity savings, based on an average electricity consumption 










Great -137 -11.0% 0.0255 
Good 45 3.61% 0.1720 
More than Average 79 6.34% 0.0661 
Table 4.18  Electricity Savings by Performance Category 
92 
 
The most striking finding in Table 4.18 is that the households who received home energy 
reports that labeled them as “Great” in terms of their energy efficiency demonstrated an 
increase in energy consumption of 11%, and this increase is statistically significant with a 
P-value of 0.0255.  This 11% increase is in comparison to the households who were also 
categorized as “Great” in the month of June, but did not receive the home energy reports.  
Thus, the boomerang effect is observed in this research in spite of the use of injunctive 
norms in the home energy report.  This result indicates that injunctive norms may only 
function to eliminate the boomerang effect when the boundary condition of financial 
incentives is present.    
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Chapter 5:  Normative-Based Billing Analysis 
Historically, residents of military family housing have not paid for their utility usage.  
This has allowed residents to consume energy in their homes without regard for the cost 
of that energy.  However, this is beginning to change.  Over the last decade, the 
Department of Defense has relied on a housing privatization program to modernize its 
large housing stock (Military Housing Privatization, 2012).  Through this program, 
private companies have paid the huge capital costs associated with new construction and 
have built thousands of new neighborhoods on military bases throughout the United 
States.  In return, these private companies receive the housing allowance of the military 
members who reside in the homes on base, with this housing allowance essentially 
amounting to a rent payment.  As part of this transition to housing privatization, the 
Department of Defense has established regulations that mandate utility billing in an effort 
to reduce household energy consumption by holding residents financially accountable for 
their energy consumption.  Prior to privatization, homes in military family housing were 
not individually metered and residents did not receive utility bills.  While this transition 
will take many more years, it is well underway, with one-third of military family housing 
residents already receiving utility bills (Jowers, 2012). 
A couple noteworthy challenges exist in implementing a billing system in military family 
housing.  First, the residents are not accustomed to being held financially accountable for 
their energy consumption.  This makes it especially important that the implemented 
billing system be perceived as fair.  And second, military members that live on base are 
assigned to live in a particular neighborhood based on their rank.  Maintaining fairness in 
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a billing system is challenging when some neighborhoods contain new, energy-efficient 
homes and some neighborhoods contain old, inefficient homes.  While most military 
members can choose to live outside the base, some are required to live on the base, 
depending on their responsibilities. And, of those with a choice, many still choose to live 
on the base because of the closeness to their work and the familiar community.  But once 
they make a decision to live on the base, they lose some of their autonomy.  They are 
then assigned a home to live in, with the neighborhoods established by rank.  Because 
some neighborhoods are older than others and because of the differences in each 
floorplan, it could be unfair to charge residents for their gross utility consumption, 
considering that they do not get to choose their specific home and could end up in an 
older, less energy-efficient home.  Also, in order to “pay the rent” to the private 
developers, the military directly pays what is called the Basic Allowance for Housing 
(BAH) to the company each month for each occupied home.  This BAH is based on a 
member’s rank and the geographic region and includes a portion for utilities.  The BAH 
is the amount of money that a military member would receive for housing if they chose to 
live off of the military installation.  Thus, the BAH represents a fair and predictable way 
to establish the appropriate rent.  And because it includes a portion for utilities, this 
means that the private developer is essentially already receiving utility payments from the 
residents.  So, an important question is how to develop a billing system that holds 




To address these challenges, the mandated billing policies have required that a baseline 
be established each month for each home type, based on floor plan and age, and that 
residents make payments for their consumption over the baseline and receive payments 
for their consumption under the baseline.  Such a program introduces financial 
accountability for energy consumption, and also provides a unique form of feedback to 
residents different from that provided through a traditional utility billing program. 
5.1 Purpose of Normative-Based Billing Analysis 
Each branch of the military has authority to implement the utility billing program in the 
way they determine best.  This has led to different variations of the baseline billing 
program.  The Air Force, for instance, will implement a program in which the monthly 
baselines are based on a five year rolling average for that particular month.  That is, in 
any given month, a home will be compared against the average consumption of similar 
homes in that calendar month over the last five years.  The Army, on the other hand, has 
implemented a billing system of particular interest to the proposed line of research.  In 
their billing system, the monthly baseline is simply the average consumption of similar 
homes during that actual month.  This is essentially the application of normative feedback 
with rewards or penalties for deviation from the norm.  The proposed research will refer 
to this as a normative-based billing system, and it is illustrated again in Figure 5.1.  
Residents are not only provided with feedback each month on how their consumption 
compares to the consumption of others, but they also have to pay for any deviation above 




Figure 5.1  Variation 3:  Normative Feedback as Basis for Utility Billing System 
The research need related to these utility billing systems is the development of an 
optimization model to determine the best possible billing system.  Such a model would 
attempt to maximize the profit of the private company as the owners of the homes.  
Because their profit is directly impacted by occupancy rates, this approach would 
indirectly incorporate an element of resident satisfaction that would be impacted by the 
management of the utility billing program.  The profit being maximized would also be 
impacted by the amount of energy consumed, as ownership is responsible for paying the 
aggregate utility bill for the community.  This results in a certain amount of tension 
between maintaining occupancy rates, which are not guaranteed, and driving energy 
conservation behaviors through household utility billing. 
The proposed research takes an initial step towards this optimization model by 
determining the energy savings associated with the implementation of a normative-based 
billing program by the Army.  A normative-based billing system, as already mentioned, is 
essentially the application of normative feedback with rewards and penalties.  Other 
studies on rewards for energy conservation behavior have consistently found energy 
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savings (Winett, Kagel, Battalio, & Winkler, 1978) (Slavin, Wodanski, & Blackburn, 
1981).  Therefore, this study also expects to find positive energy savings.  No formal 
hypothesis was put forward for this third variation of the normative feedback model.  As 
stated in the introduction, the objective of this component of the research was to 
determine the actual amount of energy savings associated with the introduction of the 
normative-based billing system.  That determination will ultimately feed into an 
optimization model to analyze the different utility billing programs being considered and 
implemented by the different branches of the military. 
5.2 Military Family Housing at Fort Belvoir 
The third variation of the normative feedback model was tested through a regression 
analysis on energy consumption data associated with the implementation of a normative-
based billing program at Fort Belvoir in Virginia.  The billing program began in June of 
2006 with residents in two neighborhoods receiving “mock” utility bills for eight months 
before “live” billing began in February of 2007.  Mock bills were designed to prepare 
residents for the transition and did not involve any financial transactions.  Unfortunately, 
data are not available for the time period before mock billing began.  The available data 
begin in June of 2006 and continue through December of 2008, representing over 18,000 
observations.  At different times throughout this period, six additional neighborhoods 
began receiving mock bills for a few months and then transitioned to live billing.  The 
savings associated with the billing program will be determined by analyzing the impact 
of the transition from mock billing to live billing, which represents the actual introduction 
of residents being held financially accountable for their utility usage.  The homes on Fort 
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Belvoir are owned by Clark Realty Group and they have provided the data for this 
analysis. 
Fort Belvoir has privatized housing, with 15 neighborhoods containing over 2,000 homes.  
Around 1,500 of those homes have been built since 2005.  Unit types include single 
family homes, duplexes, and townhouses.  The homes are individually metered for 
utilities, to include water.  They are fueled by both electricity and natural gas.  The 
normative-based billing program sends billing statements to the residents each month, 
holding them financially accountable for both their electricity and natural gas 
consumption. 
The details of the billing program center on the calculation of the baseline consumption 
each month.  This baseline is established for electricity and gas individually, and is 
calculated as the average consumption of other homes in the same profile.  A separate 
profile exists for each floorplan.  After the baseline is calculated, a buffer zone, or “grace 
zone,” is set at 10% above the baseline and 10% below the baseline.  The household’s 
consumption is compared against the baseline for that month.  If it is within the buffer 
zone, no financial transaction needs to take place.  If it is above the buffer zone, the 
resident is billed for the amount of consumption above the buffer zone.  If it is below the 
buffer zone, the resident receives a credit for the amount of consumption below the buffer 
zone.  Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show excerpts from a sample billing statement.  This statement 
is from a different Army installation and only contains electricity information, but it is 
still representative of the billing process.  For dual fuel billing statements, the billable 




Figure 5.2  Top Half of Normative-Based Billing Statement 
 
Figure 5.3  Bottom Half of Normative-Based Billing Statement 
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While some military privatization projects have only replaced a small portion of a 
military base’s family housing, the project at Fort Belvoir replaced almost the entire stock 
of housing.  As construction on each new neighborhood completed, the households in 
that neighborhood would begin receiving mock utility bills.  These mock bills looked just 
like actual bills except that no actual financial transaction would take place.  They were 
intended to prepare the residents for the full transition to live billing.  Table 5.1 lists the 
eight neighborhoods and the month in which each neighborhood transitioned from mock 




1 Herryford Village Feb-07 
2 Vernondale Village Feb-07 
3 Cedar Grove Sep-07 
4 Lewis Village Oct-07 
5 George Washington Dec-07 
6 Rossell Village Mar-08 
7 Colyer Village Nov-08 
8 Fairfax Village Sep-09 
Table 5.1  Timeline of Transition from Mock Billing to Live Billing 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
The research objective associated with the third variation of the normative feedback 
model stated:  determine overall energy savings associated with the implementation of a 
normative-based utility billing system into a community previously not held financially 
accountable for household energy consumption.  To accomplish this objective, it is not 
possible to simply compare energy consumption before live billing started to energy 
consumption after live billing started.  This would not account for variations in weather.  
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A household’s monthly energy consumption is dramatically impacted by that month’s 
weather.  The timeline chart on the billing statement in Figure 5.3 demonstrates this.  
Typically, during summer months, the air conditioner consumes large amounts of 
electricity.  And during winter months, the furnace consumes large amounts of either 
electricity or natural gas, and hot water heaters have to work harder as well.  Certain 
months in the spring and summer can allow for lower energy consumption due to 
moderate weather.  These dynamics, of course, vary from location to location. 
A multiple regression analysis, however, can account for the changes in weather over 
time.  With household energy consumption as a continuous dependent variable, two 
independent variables related to the weather were considered in the analysis:  heating 
degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD).  These continuous variables provide 
quantification for the amount of heating and cooling required in any given month.  By 
controlling for the differences between weather before the billing transition and weather 
after the billing transition, an analysis could effectively be made on the impact of live 
billing.  The regression analysis included other independent variables as well, some of 
which were continuous, and some of which were categorical. 
5.3.1 Description of Data 
The data available for this analysis begin in June of 2006.  That is the month that the 
Herryford and Vernondale villages began receiving mock utility bills.  The data extend 
through December of 2008, with the exception of April of 2008, which is missing for 
unknown reasons.  The raw data received listed each home and their respective gas and 
electric consumption each month.  These values were converted into a single value of 
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energy consumption by converting each to kBtu and adding them together.  The data also 
included square footage of each home, the neighborhood, and the unit type.  Unoccupied 
homes and faulty meter readings were deleted.  The resulting data set included over 
18,000 observations.  Additional fields were included in the data set.  Specifically, a 
value of zero was assigned to an observation made during a month in which mock bills 
were received, while a value of one was assigned to an observation made during a month 
in which live bills were received.  This represents our variable of interest.  Also, weather 
data was incorporated in the form of heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days 
(CDD) for each month. 
An initial exploration of the data reveals some helpful descriptions.  For instance, about a 
quarter of the observations took place during mock billing months, as shown below in 
Table 5.2. 
 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Mock Billing 4,377 24.03 24.03 
Live Billing 13,839 75.97 100 
Total 18,216 100   
Table 5.2  Breakdown of Mock Billing Versus Live Billing Frequency 
Also, since the goal is to measure the energy savings resulting from the implementation 
of the billing system, we can take a quick look at the energy consumed under mock 











Mock Billing 7779 3484 4377 
Live Billing 7726 3345 13839 
Total 7739 3379 18216 
Table 5.3  Energy Consumption During Mock Billing Versus Live Billing 
At first glance, this would indicate a fairly negligible energy savings of 0.68%.  But this 
would be an incomplete analysis, due especially to the monthly variations in weather.  To 
account for such variations, as well as other influencing variables, such as the square 
footage of the house and the house type (townhouse, duplex, or single family home), a 
multiple regression analysis is required.  The total monthly energy consumed by each 
household is the continuous dependent variable, called Total kBtu, and the list of 
independent variables is as follows: 
∙ Square Footage 
∙ Heating Degree Days (HDD) 
∙ Cooling Degree Days (CDD) 
∙ Live Billing (0 for mock billing; 1 for live billing) 
∙ Unit Type (1=Townhouse, 2=Duplex, 3=Single Family Home) 
∙ Village Number (1-8, as defined in Table 5.1) 
Each of these variables accounts for either the variety between the physical 
characteristics of the houses, the variety between the neighborhoods to include differing 
rank structure, or the variety in monthly weather conditions.  The variable of interest is 
“Live Billing” whose coefficient will give us direct information on the savings associated 
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with the transition from mock billing to live billing across all the neighborhoods.  
Unfortunately, no data is available for the number of occupants in each home. 
5.3.2 Dependent Variable 
Before jumping into the regression analysis, we should take a look at each variable.  First, 
let’s look at Table 5.4 for some descriptive statistics and Figure 5.4 for a boxplot of our 
dependent variable, Total kBtu. 




Total kBtu 18216 7739 3379 530 26519 
Table 5.4  Descriptive Statistics for Total kBtu 
 



































We can see that Total kBtu has a mean of 7,739 kBtu and is skewed to the right.  We can 
also examine its distribution in Figure 5.5 and note that it has a fairly normal distribution, 
though certainly not perfectly normal. 
 
Figure 5.5  Distribution of Total kBtu 
5.3.3 Independent Variables 
The first independent variable to be examined is Square Footage.  Table 5.5 presents the 
descriptive statistics and Figure 5.6 shows the distribution.  This is a continuous variable 
in theory, but because of the limited number of floorplans, it plots as more of a 
categorical variable. 






18216 1794 280 1460 2579 






























Figure 5.6  Distribution of Square Footage 
Nevertheless, we will treat this as a continuous variable in our analysis.  HDD and CDD 
behave in a similar manner because of the limited number of months involved in the 
analysis.  They also will be treated as continuous variables and have the following 
descriptive statistics: 




HDD 18216 335 336 0 876 
CDD 18216 104 128 0 368 
Table 5.6  Descriptive Statistics for HDD and CDD 
We need to check whether a linear relationship exists between each of these three 
continuous independent variables and our dependent variable.  The scatter plots for these 
variables are shown in Figures 5.7 to 5.9.  We can see that the relationships are fairly 
linear, and that Total kBtu generally increases as each independent variable increases.  
The exception is CDD, which maintains a slope near zero, due in part to the decrease in 

































Figure 5.7  Scatter Plot of Square Footage Versus Total kBtu 
 
Figure 5.8  Scatter Plot of HDD Versus Total kBtu 
  









































































































For the categorical variables of Unit Type and Village, we observe the following 
characteristics in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
House Type Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Townhouse 2,876 15.79 15.79 
Duplex 8,897 48.84 64.63 
SFH 6,443 35.37 100 
Total 18,216 100   
Table 5.7  Breakdown of Homes by Unit Type 
Village 
Number 
Village Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 Herryford Village 4,429 24.31 24.31 
2 Vernondale Village 4,569 25.08 49.4 
3 Cedar Grove 1,192 6.54 55.94 
4 Lewis Village 4,509 24.75 80.69 
5 George Washington 2,483 13.63 94.32 
6 Rossell Village 734 4.03 98.35 
7 Colyer Village 217 1.19 99.54 
8 Fairfax Village 83 0.46 100 
  Total 18,216 100   
Table 5.8  Breakdown of Homes by Neighborhood 
Of most notable interest from these tables is the fact that about 75% of the observations 
came from just three neighborhoods. 
In addition to controlling for the above continuous and categorical variables, we also 
need to account for the dependency associated with the repetitive observations made on 
the same family again and again each month.  This can be accomplished by clustering on 
a variable that uniquely identifies each family.  This variable, called Family ID, assigns a 
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unique number not just to each house, but to each family.  Thus, each time a family 
moved out of a house during the study time period, the new family that moved in was 
assigned a new Family ID.  This is especially important in military family housing where 
residents move every three years on average.  We find that there are 1,622 unique 
families that lived in the 1,095 homes during the course of the time period under 
investigation. 
5.4 Regression Results and Interpretation 
Running the regression analysis yields the results shown in Table 5.9.  The full software 




Square Feet 3.65 (0.000) 
HDD 9.08 (0.000) 
CDD 7.37 (0.000) 
Live Billing -1091.14 (0.000) 
House Type   
  Townhouse         ----- 
  Duplex 816.18 (0.000) 
  SFH 1882.20 (0.000) 
Village   
  Herryford Village          ----- 
  Vernondale Village -410.56 (0.002) 
  Cedar Grove -1991.04 (0.000) 
  Lewis Village -1544.14 (0.000) 
  George Washington -1161.20 (0.000) 
  Rossell Village -1550.95 (0.000) 
  Colyer Village -1964.74 (0.000) 
  Fairfax Village -2444.81 (0.000) 
Constant -1987.62 (0.000) 
Note:  r
2
 = 0.627; P-values in parentheses 
Table 5.9  Regression Results for Billing Analysis 
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Each variable is highly significant and our r-squared indicates that our variables are 
accounting for a sizable amount of the variation in the observations.  Our coefficient of 
interest, Live Billing, tells us that the transition from mock billing to live billing yielded 
1,091 kBtu in monthly energy savings.  With mean monthly energy consumption of 7,739 
kBtu, this represents 14.1% savings.  But we can make some other interesting 
observations from this output as well.  We can see that for every 1,000 square foot 
increase, we find an increase of 3,650 kBtu.  We see that heating consumes more energy 
than cooling.  We notice that, while controlling for house size through the square footage 
variable, we still see that single family homes consume more energy than duplexes which 
consume more than townhomes.  To investigate the neighborhood influences in more 
details, Table 5.10 provides a breakdown by rank. 
Number Village Name Rank 
1 Herryford Village E1-E5 
2 Vernondale Village E6-E8 
3 Cedar Grove O4/O5 
4 Lewis Village E1-E9 
5 George Washington E1-E8 
6 Rossell Village O1/O5 
7 Colyer Village E6-E8 
8 Fairfax Village O4/O5 
Table 5.10  Breakdown of Neighborhoods by Rank 
We also need to take a look at the residual plots to ensure they are centered about zero.  
They are, for the most part, which confirms their homoskedasticity.  Figure 5.10 to 5.12 




Figure 5.10  Residual Plot for Square Footage 
  
Figure 5.11  Residual Plot for HDD 
 






































































































A final note about the regression results regards the assumption of normal distribution we 
made for the dependent variable, Total kBtu.  The assumption was reasonable, but if we 
were to take the natural logarithm of Total kBtu, we would actually find a more normal 
distribution.  When the regression analysis was run for the transformed variable, the 
coefficient for Live Billing was -.1387, indicating a savings of approximately 13.9%.  
This is comparable to the 14.1% savings we identified without transforming the 
dependent variable. 
The primary conclusion from this study is the identification of 14.1% savings in energy 
consumption as a result of holding residents financially accountable for their utility 
usage.  This conclusion is displayed in Figure 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.13  Energy Savings of Normative-Based Billing Implementation 
As the ultimate purpose for identifying these energy savings is to produce an 
optimization model allowing comparison of different billing programs, it is also useful to 
examine the impact of the billing system over time.  This will provide insight on whether 
residents maintain their initial response to the billing implementation or whether it 
changes over time.  This would be a relevant observation to incorporate into the future 
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optimization.  To perform this analysis, we first need to generate a new variable called 
Post-Transition Months.  This simply measures the amount of time that a particular 
family has lived in the home since the transition to live billing.  By inserting this variable 
into our regression analysis, we can then examine the predictive margins of this variable.  
The chart in Figure 5.14 shows the predicted values of Total kBtu, based on the 
regression equation, plotted against the new variable of Post-Transition Months. 
 
Figure 5.14  Predictive Margins of Post-Transition Months 
This graph indicates that residents adjusted their energy consuming behaviors most 
significantly in the first two months of live billing.  After this initial drop-off, their 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Summary of Research Results 
This research has studied one of the more promising innovations in the field of energy 
conservation.  Over the last several years, a company called OPOWER has incorporated 
research from the field of social norms into home energy reports which they have mailed 
to hundreds of thousands of households.  These reports provide normative feedback, 
meaning they compare the household’s energy consumption with that of other homes in 
the area.  The resulting energy savings from the reports have ranged between 1.4% and 
3.1%.  This extensive application of social norms to influence energy conservation 
behaviors has been described by this research as the basic normative feedback model.  
This research has tested three variations of that basic normative feedback model, 
measuring the associated energy savings of each variation.  The first two variations were 
tested through an experiment that involved mailing home energy reports to residents of 
military family housing on Joint Base Andrews in Maryland.  The third variation 
involved analyzing the transition to a normative-based utility billing system in military 
family housing on Fort Belvoir in Virginia. 
The home energy report experiment was conducted at Joint Base Andrews, a base in 
which no utility billing program is currently in place.  The experiment tested:  1) whether 
normative feedback could generate energy savings in the absence of a utility billing 
system that would provide financial incentive for conservation, and 2) whether increasing 
the proximity of the comparisons from the neighborhood level, to the street level, and to 
the next-door neighbor level could generate increasing levels of energy savings.  The 
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experimental analysis revealed an overall electricity savings of 3.8%, indicating that 
normative feedback can still generate energy savings even without financial incentives.  
The experiment also found that increasing the proximity of the comparison level from 
neighborhood to street increased the electricity savings from 3.8% to 4.9%, but then 
further increasing the comparison level to next-door neighbor actually decreased the 
electricity savings down to 2.8%.  This indicates the effectiveness of increasing the 
proximity of comparison, but also indicates that increasing the proximity level too far 
actually reduces the effectiveness of the normative feedback. 
In addition to the home energy report experiment, this research also examined the use of 
normative feedback as the basis for a utility billing system.  With the military 
transitioning to residential utility billing, Fort Belvoir implemented a billing system in 
which household energy consumption is compared to the average consumption, and the 
residents either get billed for over-consumption or receive a payment for under-
consumption.  This research performed a regression analysis to determine the energy 
savings that resulted from the implementation of this normative-based billing system and 
found the savings to be 14.1%. 
6.2 Contributions and Implications of the Research 
As normative feedback for energy consumption has emerged as a highly cost-effective 
and scalable means of obtaining energy savings, it has received increasing research 
attention.  Other research projects have studied how variables such as the frequency of 
the feedback, the mode of the feedback, and the format of the feedback can impact the 
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resulting energy savings.  But there remain some significant gaps in the body of 
knowledge, and this research helps close three of those gaps. 
First, this research tested one of the boundary conditions of the basic normative feedback 
model.  Whereas all of OPOWER’s home energy reports are provided to residences that 
receive regular utility bills, this research demonstrated that significant energy savings can 
still be achieved without financial incentives involved.  This indicates that although 
financial incentives may still influence behaviors, the normative feedback model does not 
require their presence in order to generate energy savings.  Thus, future applications of 
normative feedback for energy conservation should also target facilities in which the 
occupants do not pay for utility consumption.  This could include providing normative 
feedback to residents of college dormitories, apartment complexes, and even office 
buildings. 
Second, this research tested whether increasing the proximity level of the comparisons in 
the home energy reports can increase the resulting energy savings.  We found that 
increasing the proximity of the comparison from “Neighborhood” to “Street” indeed 
increased energy savings, but that further increasing the proximity to “Next-Door 
Neighbor” decreased energy savings to the lowest savings percentage of all three 
comparison levels.  This idea of comparison proximity increasing the impact of 
normative feedback has been suggested and tested in one other study within the context 
of hotel towel reuse, but this is the first study to establish three different comparison 
levels and to conduct an experiment in the realm of household energy conservation.  The 
implication of this portion of the research is that there exists a “sweet spot” in setting the 
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proximity of comparisons in normative feedback.  Future applications of normative 
feedback for household energy conservation can increase the treatment effect by 
increasing the proximity of the comparisons to the “Street” level. 
Third, this research measures the energy savings that resulted from the implementation of 
a normative-based utility billing system.  The measured savings of 14.1% provide an 
indication on the impact of financial incentives above and beyond the normative 
feedback, when the amount of those financial incentives are determined based on 
deviation from normative behavior.  No previous research has investigated the 
implementation of a billing system that is based on normative feedback and normative 
behaviors.  This research measured the energy savings and determined how those savings 
were obtained over time, taking the first steps the development of a billing optimization 
model for potential use by the Department of Defense in establishing utility billing 
programs. 
The concept of presenting information on socially normative behavior as a tool to 
influence behaviors is of particular interest to the project manager.  A project manager 
has to find ways to motivate project team members and normative feedback should be 
one of the tools considered.  For instance, a construction project manager might 
encourage positive safety behaviors on the job site by providing normative feedback to 
employees regarding safety metrics on other jobs.  This research would indicate that the 
normative feedback provided ought to provide comparisons at a certain optimum 
proximity level.  In the case of safety comparisons, it may be optimal to provide 
comparisons to other construction jobs within the same city, as opposed to a higher 
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proximity level such as nationwide metrics or a lower proximity level such as local 
company metrics. 
6.3 Limitations of the Research 
Two aspects of the home energy report experiment cause there to be limitations in the 
extensibility of the results.  The home energy report experiment was conducted 
exclusively in the summer, and only electricity usage data was available.  Thus, while the 
conclusions of this research would likely apply to winter months and natural gas 
consumption, that cannot be confirmed by this research.  An experiment conducted over 
the course of an entire year would improve the reliability of the results. 
Also, all of the houses involved in this research, both for the home energy report 
experiment and the normative-based billing, exist on military installations with military 
families living in them.  There are unique aspects of the military and military family 
housing that could have produced unique results.  For instance, the neighborhoods are all 
established based on the rank of the military member in the household.  This leads to very 
homogenous neighborhoods, both in terms of the professional demographics, but also the 
physical houses themselves, as home size is strongly impacted by rank as well.  This 
homogeneity could lead to responses to normative feedback that differ from the 
population at large. It may be, perhaps, that social norms govern behavior to a greater 
degree in the military environment, an environment in which standardization and 




6.4 Further Research 
As the military continues to transition to utility billing in family housing, some details of 
the program remain unsettled.  The Army is far ahead of the other services in terms of the 
rate of transition.  The other services are observing the Army’s outcomes as they craft 
their own programs.  The need exists for developing an optimization model to determine 
a billing program that satisfies the requirements of the government to reduce energy 
consumption, while optimizing resident satisfaction and contractor profit.  This research 
evaluates key aspects of the Army’s implementation of normative-based billing at Fort 
Belvoir, and thereby takes an initial step towards developing such an optimization model, 
but much more work needs to be done on this.  Determining energy savings and 
investigating occupant response over time are only the first steps. 
Future work could also focus on further improvements to the normative feedback model. 
While this research identified the “Street” level of comparison as the optimum level out 
of the three proximity levels tested, there may exist a proximity level that could further 
increase effectiveness without beginning to suffer from the effects of the actor-observer 
bias.  For instance, a comparison to the nearest 10 homes may be the true “sweet spot.”  
Future home energy report experiments should consider testing a higher number of 
proximity levels, if the number of observations could be high enough to support this from 
a statistical perspective. 
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July 13, 2012 
Dear Resident, 
The University of Maryland and Liberty Park at Andrews have partnered to provide you the 
enclosed Home Energy Report.  The purpose of this report is to provide you with feedback on 
your household’s electricity usage as it compares to others in the community.  Please note that 
this is not a bill.  You have been randomly selected to receive this report as part of a research 
study by the University of Maryland, and can expect to receive this report for three consecutive 
months.  If you have any questions or desire further information, please contact Maj Robert 
Young at 719-314-7328 or robyoung@umd.edu. Thank you! 
Sincerely, 
 
Robert M. Young, Maj, USAF  
AFIT/CIP Student 







LIBERTY PARK AT ANDREWS  
2097 SAN ANTONIO BLVD.  ANDREWS AFB, MD 20762 





















Home Energy Report 
for  
4028 Ashwood Circle Unit 2 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 2% LESS electricity than your most efficient neighbors. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes in your village that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
in your village that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
4021 Ashwood Circle Unit 1 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 53% MORE electricity than your most efficient neighbors. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes in your village that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
in your village that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
2024B Bedford Square 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 4% MORE electricity than neighbors in your village. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes in your village that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
in your village that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
2039 Bedford Drive 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 3% LESS electricity than your most efficient neighbor. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“Next Door Neighbors”:  Four neighboring homes, specifically 
the nearest two occupied homes on each side of your home. 
“Most Efficient Neighbor”:  The most efficient of the four 
neighboring homes. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
2 Airey Court 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 4% MORE electricity than your most efficient neighbor. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“Next Door Neighbors”:  Four neighboring homes, specifically 
the nearest two occupied homes on each side of your home. 
“Most Efficient Neighbor”:  The most efficient of the four 
neighboring homes. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 







Home Energy Report 
for  
4023 Ashwood Circle Unit 1 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 19% MORE electricity than your next door neighbors. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“Next Door Neighbors”:  Four neighboring homes, specifically 
the nearest two occupied homes on each side of your home. 
“Most Efficient Neighbor”:  The most efficient of the four 
neighboring homes. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
2048A Bedford Drive 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 30% LESS electricity than your most efficient neighbors. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes on your street that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
on your street that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
4023 Ashwood Circle Unit 3 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 20% MORE electricity than your most efficient neighbors. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 
the equipment is not in use—TVs and DVDs in standby mode still use several watts of power. 
 
 
Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes on your street that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
on your street that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 






Home Energy Report 
for  
2021B Bedford Drive 
 
June 2012 Household Comparison  |  You used 75% MORE electricity than neighbors on your street. 
        








 Check to see that windows and doors are closed when cooling your home. 
 Raise the temperature setting on your thermostat when your home is unoccupied. 
 Turn things off when you are not in the room such as lights, TVs, entertainment systems, and 
computers. 
 Plug home electronics, such as TVs and DVD players, into power strips; turn the power strips off when 




Note:  The above numbers are normalized for home size and represent monthly electricity usage per square foot (watt∙hr/ft2). 
“All Neighbors”:  All the homes on your street that were 
occupied for all of last month. 
“Efficient Neighbors”:  The most efficient 20% of all the homes 
on your street that were occupied for all of last month. 
WHO ARE YOUR 
“NEIGHBORS”? 
TIPS TO SAVE ENERGY IN JULY 















                                                                                    
             _cons       -170.6    203.895    -0.84   0.403    -571.2498    230.0498
                    
                3     -34.68978   24.09741    -1.44   0.151    -82.04074    12.66117
                2     -60.33847   26.76413    -2.25   0.025    -112.9295   -7.747441
                1     -46.94886   34.95498    -1.34   0.180    -115.6347    21.73702
   experimentgroup  
                    
                3      96.97934   50.34956     1.93   0.055    -1.956611    195.9153
                2      34.54905   31.29746     1.10   0.270    -26.94988    96.04798
    unittypenumber  
                    
               11      -26.5119   102.3812    -0.26   0.796     -227.689    174.6652
               10     -14.63331   129.4178    -0.11   0.910    -268.9368    239.6702
                9     -92.36241    87.8525    -1.05   0.294    -264.9909    80.26612
                8     -188.9319   113.3101    -1.67   0.096    -411.5842    33.72028
                7     -4.296832   134.2456    -0.03   0.974    -268.0869    259.4932
                6     -59.76036   96.31526    -0.62   0.535     -249.018    129.4973
                5     -62.55049   74.17654    -0.84   0.400     -208.306    83.20503
                4     -42.38705   110.7766    -0.38   0.702    -260.0611     175.287
                3     -111.2556   115.0723    -0.97   0.334    -337.3704    114.8593
                2      40.91437   60.90197     0.67   0.502    -78.75687    160.5856
neighborhoodnumber  
                    
               cdd     1.442203   .0379716    37.98   0.000     1.367589    1.516816
        squarefeet    -.1186182   .0746243    -1.59   0.113    -.2652535    .0280172
                                                                                    
differencefromjune        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 475 clusters in homeid)
                                                       Root MSE      =  250.94
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4583
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 17,   474) =   89.28
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1425
> p, cluster(homeid) robust









                                                                               
        _cons    -1987.623   328.7536    -6.05   0.000     -2632.45   -1342.796
               
           8     -2444.807   288.5148    -8.47   0.000    -3010.708   -1878.906
           7     -1964.743   227.0833    -8.65   0.000    -2410.151   -1519.335
           6     -1550.945   275.9082    -5.62   0.000    -2092.119   -1009.771
           5     -1161.198   159.3362    -7.29   0.000    -1473.724   -848.6712
           4      -1544.14   120.9118   -12.77   0.000      -1781.3    -1306.98
           3     -1991.038     205.91    -9.67   0.000    -2394.915    -1587.16
           2     -410.5606   131.6581    -3.12   0.002    -668.7986   -152.3226
villagenumber  
               
           3      1882.202   150.8198    12.48   0.000      1586.38    2178.024
           2      816.1772   131.9676     6.18   0.000     557.3323    1075.022
housetypenu~r  
               
1.livebilling    -1091.137   49.86629   -21.88   0.000    -1188.946   -993.3281
          cdd     7.371486    .159431    46.24   0.000     7.058773    7.684198
          hdd     9.079375   .0999249    90.86   0.000      8.88338    9.275371
       sqfeet     3.652766   .1967886    18.56   0.000      3.26678    4.038753
                                                                               
    totalkbtu        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                             (Std. Err. adjusted for 1622 clusters in familyid)
                                                       Root MSE      =  2065.6
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6266
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 13,  1621) =  798.53
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   18216
> cluster(familyid) robust
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